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THE LEGAL STATUS OF UNION SECURITY FEE
ARBITRATION AFTER CHICAGO TEACHERS
UNION V. HUDSONt
Martin H. Malin*
When a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit selects a union to represent
them, the union becomes the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in
the unit. Selection of the union as exclusive representative does not necessarily require
all employees 10 join the union. Nevertheless, the union is required to represent all
bargaining unit employees regardless of union membership in dealing with the employer
concerning wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment)
The union's responsibility to represent all employees renders it vulnerable to the
possibility that some employees will receive the benefits of union representation but,
because they do not join the union and pay dues, will not contribute to the costs of
representation. To prevent nonmembers from "free riding" on the dues paid by mem-
bers, unions and employers frequently agree to union shop, agency shop or fair share
provisions in their collective bargaining agreements. Union shop provisions require that
all employees join the union after a specified grace period to retain their jobs. Agency
shop or fair share fee provisions require all nonmember employees to pay the union a
fee to cover their share of the costs of representation. 2 Incorporating such provisions
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L See generally ,f.l. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944). A union that discriminates against
nonmembers in -performing its representational duties breaches its duty of fair representation. See,
e,g., Del Casal v, Eastern Airlines, 634 F.2d 295, 300-01 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981);
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 6000 v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
Jones v. Trans World Airlines, 495 F.2d 790, 797 (2d Cir. 1974).
2 Both types of union security provisions effectively serve the same purpose of compelling
employees who would not otherwise do so to contribute to the costs of their representation. The
union shop's membership requirement is tempered by statutory provisions that prohibit discharge
for loss of union membership, except where that loss results from a failure to pay dues. See, e.g.,
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3), (h)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(3), (b)(2). Employees may ter-
minate their formal membership voluntarily and still avoid discharge by continuing to tender an
amount equal to union dues. NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975).
A union lawfully may not represent to new employees that they are required to comply with
obligations of membership other than payment of dues. United Stanford Employees Local 680 v.
NLRB, 601 F.2cl 980, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court has observed that the union shop is the "practical equivalent' . of the agency
shop, NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963), but has not had occasion to decide
whether the differences between the two are constitutionally significant. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977). In Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists,
496 E2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974), the Second Circuit held that, to the extent
that a union shop agreement imposes only a requirement to pay dues, it is not constitutionally
different from an agency shop agreement. The distinction between union shop and agency shop
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into the collective bargaining agreements between a union and a public employer im-
plicates the first amendment rights of employees who object to them. Although it is not
unconstitutional to charge and to collect a union security fee, a public employee has a
first amendment right not to be compelled to contribute to expenditures of a political
or ideological nature that are not germane to collective bargaining. 3 In Chicago Teachers
Union, Local 1 v. Hudson' the Supreme Court held that, to safeguard employees' first
amendment rights, unions must provide those who object to political and ideological
expenditures with a fair opportunity to contest charges for those expenditures. The
contest procedure must result in a reasonably prompt resolution by a neutral decision-
maker. 5
 The Court expressly approved arbitration as an appropriate procedure for
resolving such contests. 5
 The Court did not, however, offer much guidance on the role
of arbitration in union security fee dispute resolution. Nor did it offer any guidance on
the appropriate allocation of dispute resolution functions between the arbitrator and the
courts. Thus, although the Court mandated that unions establish procedures to safe-
guard nonmember employee rights, it left a major void concerning the implementation
of those procedures. Unions, employees, public employers and arbitrators must act at
their peril.
This article attempts to fill this void. Section I discusses Hudson and judicially
mandated union security fee procedures.? Section II develops the role of union security
fee arbitration by contrasting it with the role of the traditional grievance arbitration."
Sections I and II Jay a foundation. for the remainder of the article, which presents a
theory of the legal status of union security arbitration.
Section III focuses on the source of the arbitrator's authority to resolve union
security fee objections. 5 It suggests that, like the grievance arbitrator, the union security
fee arbitrator derives his or her authority from the applicable collective bargaining
agreement. This conclusion leads to an analysis of the respective roles of the arbitrator
and the court, which is the subject of Sections IV and V.
Section 1V considers whether' nonmember objectors may bypass the arbitration
procedure and litigate their objections in federal court.'° Subsection IV.A concludes that
they may not because they are bound by the collective bargaining agreement and because
of the role of arbitration in union security fee dispute resolution." Subsections I V.B and
IV.0 then reject the proposition that this conclusion is inconsistent with Supreme Court
interpretations of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 1 ? and of required union
security lee objection procedures, respectively." Finally, Subsection IVA) concludes that
agreements may be constitutionally significant, however, regarding the requirement of notice to
potential objectors, which the Supreme Court announced in Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v.
Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986). See infra note 38 and accompanying text. This article will refer
collectively to union shop, agency shop, fair share and all similar fees as "union security fees."
" /Mood v. Detroit Rd. of Ethic., 431 U.S. 209,233-35 (1977).
475 U.S. 292 (1986).
id. at 307.
"Irl. at '308 11.21.
7 See infra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 46-95 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
'" See infra notes 121-82 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 124-32 and accompanying text.
,2 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See infra notes 133-60 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
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denial of pre-arbitration access to the federal courts does not impose an unconstitutional
burden on objectors' first amendment rights.' 4
Sections V and VI consider post-arbitration attacks on a union security fee award.
Section V analyzes the role of the arbitrator's award in subsequent litigation under
section 1983. 15 .It concludes that, if the parties conduct the arbitration in compliance
with certain standards of formality, nonmembers challenging the award should not
receive a trial de novo. It suggests a three-tier standard fur judicial review of the award:
de novo review of the arbitrator's conclusions of law, independent review on the record
of arbitral findings of constitutionally significant facts and broad deference to findings
of basic facts."
Section VI analyzes the role of the employer in post-arbitration litigation. 17 It con-
cludes that, if the arbitration proceeding incorporated all the Hudson safeguards, the
employer has no liability to nonmember objectors. This should be true even if the
arbitrator erred in his or her conclusions and allowed the union to charge nonmembers
for constitutionally objectionable expenditures.
I. juD ► ciAny MANDATED FEE OBJECTION PRocEouREs
Prior to Hudson, the Supreme Court considered union security fees in several cases
arising under the Railway Labor Act" and under the first amendment. These decisions
involved the propriety of charging objectors for particular expenditures. Although Hud-
son was the first case in which the Court directly faced the issue of constitutionally
required fee objection procedures, the prior cases had resolved many procedural matters.
The pre-Hudson case law established that, even where unions use union security fees
for political or ideological purposes, there is no reason to presume that the employees
are opposed to such expenditures." Accordingly, the employees have the burden to
advise the union of their objections to the use of their fees. 2° This burden is minimal,
as employees are not required to specify which expenditures they find objectionable. 21
When an employee files an objection, the union must take such steps as advanced fee
reductions and escrows to ensure that it will not use the objector's fees, even temporarily,
on q»atters that are not chargeable. 22 The union bears the burden of proving how the
objector's fees will be spent."
In Hudson the union and employer agreed that bargaining unit employees who were
not union members would pay a fair share fee to the union through mandatory payroll
deductions. 21 The union calculated the fair share fee for the coming year by determining
° See infra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
°See infra notes 183-262 and accompanying text.
' 6 See infra text following note 262.
17 See (Via notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
' 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1982).
19 E.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,768-69 (1961).
20 Id. at 774.
21 Abood v, Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,241 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. and S.5, Clerks
v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, IIH (1963).
22 Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S, Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,444 (1984).
23 Alien, 373 U.S. at 122.
2 ' Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v, Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,295 (1986). Union security clauses
usually are enforced in one or two ways. Either the employer makes mandatory payroll deductions,
as in Hudson, or the contract empowers the union to demand that the employer discharge those
who fail to pay. Threat of discharge was the enforcement mechanism the union used in Abood.
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the percentage of its income used in the previous year for admittedly objectionable
expenditures and proportionately reducing the amount of the coming year's monthly
union dues. 25 The union described the fee and procedures for objecting to it in its
newspaper, which it distributed to all employees, including nonmembers, and in flyers
and posters, which it distributed through its member delegates from all schools- 26
The union established an internal procedure for handling fee objections, which
provided for the union's executive committee's initial review of the objections. If the
committee action did not satisfy the objecting employees, they could submit their objec-
tions to arbitration. The union selected the arbitrator from a list of arbitrators whom
the Illinois State Board of Education had accredited to hear tenured teacher dismissal
cases. The union paid the costs of the proceeding, including the arbitrator's fee."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held the arbitration
procedures to he constitutionally deficient in three respects. 28 First, the union alone
selected the arbitrator. 28 The court reasoned that a procedure by which one of the parties
selected the judge could not adequately safeguard the rights of the other party." Second,
the court held that the union's payment of the arbitrator's fee gave the arbitrator a
financial interest in the outcome of the dispute.' Third, the court believed that arbitra-
tion was inherently unsuited for resolving union security fee objections." The court
opined that an arbitrator was skilled in resolving contractual issues, not in resolving
constitutional issues." The court held that., at a constitutional minimum, objectors were
entitled to "fair notice, a prompt administrative hearing ... — the hearing to incorporate
the usual safeguards for evidentiary hearings before administrative agencies — and ...
judicial review of the agency's decision."54
The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's judgment, but not its reasoning.
The Court held that the Constitution mandates procedural safeguards for two reasons."
First, the Court observed that carefully tailored procedures are necessary to minimize
the infringement. of employees' first amendment rights. 56 Second, the Court reasoned
that employees are entitled to a fair opportunity both to identify the governmental
action's impact on their interests and to assert a meritorious first amendment claim."
The Court held that a constitutionally adequate fee objection procedure must have
three components. First, the union must disclose to potential objectors the basis for
computing the fee. In the case befdre it, the Court held that the Chicago Teachers
Union's notice was inadequate because it advised nonmembers only of the percentage
of dues allocated to admittedly objectionable expenditures. It did not delineate the
expenditures that the union maintained were chargeable and on which the union based
25 Id,
illifISUP1, 573 F. Stipp, 1505, 1509 (N.D. 111. 1983).
" Ihuhütt, 475 U.S. at 296.
2' 743 Kai 1187, 1194-97 (7th Cir. 1984).
29 1d. at 1194.
'" Id. at 1195.
3' Id.
' 2 Id. at 1195-96.
33 /d. at 1196.
34 /d.
33
 Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hodson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 (1986).
3,,
 Id. at 302-03.
" Id. at 303.
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the fee. The Court reasoned that whereas employees have the burden of objecting to
charges, unless the union advises them of the basis for those charges, they are incapable
of determining whether to accept or object to the union's calculation."
Second, when the union receives objections, it must take steps to ensure that it does
not use the objectors' fees, even temporarily, for objectionable purposes. 39 The Court
suggested two ways of doing this. The union may escrow the entire fee pending reso-
lution of the objections, or may escrow part of the fee, retaining that portion that. an
independent certified public accountant has verified is not subject to reasonable chal-
lenge, less a cushion to protect against arithmetic errors. 4 °
Third, the union must provide objectors with a reasonably prompt resolution by an
impartial decisionmaker. 41 The Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit, that the Chicago
Teachers Union's arbitration scheme did not meet this standard because the union
selected the arbitrator. 42 The Court, however, expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion that arbitration is an inherently unsuitable forum for resolving fee objections.
The Court opined that expeditious arbitration might produce a reasonably prompt
decision by an impartial decisionmaker, but selection of the arbitrator must not represent
the union's unrestricted choice. 42
The Court did not address the Seventh Circuit's concern that, when the union pays
the arbitrator, the arbitrator acqiiires a financial interest in the proceeding and cannot
be impartial. The Court's silence slimild not prevent unions from paying the arbitrator's
fee. The arbitrator's financial interest arises not from union payment alone, but from
union payment coupled with exclusive union control over arbitrator selection. Under
that combination, arbilVators who rule against the unions truly would be biting the hands
that feed trial. When the union does not exclusively control the arbitrator's receipt of
future work, however, union payment of the arbitrator's fee does not give the arbitrator
a financial stake in the proceeding. This is particularly so if the arbitrator selection is
" Id. at 306. Parties and reviewing authorities easily can apply the Court's holding that potential
objectors must be given notice of the fee components to fair share or agency shop agreements. In
those cases only nonmemberi are potential objectors. In union shop agreements, however, every
member is a potential objector. A reasonable argument can be made that notice must be given to
every member. Although employees in a union shop can resign their membership and retain their
jobs by tendering amounts equal to dues, and unions cannot affirmatively mislead employees
concerning the requirements of a union shop clause, see supra note 2, unions are not obligated to
go out of their way to explain the options open to employees.
The typical union shop clause simply requires membership without any explanation of how to
meet the requirement. It is unlikely that most employees have made an informed decision to be
full members. Nevertheless, it is likely that, given the choice, most employees would opt for full
membership, In agency shop and fair share bargaining units, the overwhelming majority of em-
ployees opt for membership. Whether this phenomenon is due to indifference or a conscious
decision to retain the benefits or membership, it suggests that, in union shops, the notice of fee
calculation need not go to every member, but can be limited to those employees who have been
suspended or expelled from the union or who have indicated that they wish to limit their mem-
bership to paying dues.
39
 Id. at 305.
411 Id. at 310. The Hudson union had escrowed 100% of the objectors' fees. Id. at 309. The Court
held that, though this eliminated the risk of temporary impermissible use, it did not overcome the
union's failure to satisfy the other two procedural standards. Id.
Id. at 307.
42 Id. at 308.
43
 Id. at 308 n.21.
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entirely independent of the union, such as through appointment by the American
Arbitration Association or a state public employment relations board:" Thus, union
payment of the arbitrator's entire fee should not invalidate a fee objection procedure.
Most post -Hudson decisions have focused on the adequacy of the union's fee objection
procedures:15
 This article assumes that the union has implemented adequate procedures,
which culminate in arbitration. Compliance with• Hawn, however, raises substantial
issues regarding the proper role of arbitration in the process of union security fee
administration and litigation.
II. THE ROLE OF UNION SECURITY FEE ARBITRATION
The institution of labor arbitration developed primarily as a means of resolving
grievances over the interpretations and applications of collective bargaining agreements.
Grievance arbitration is a system mutually agreed to by the union and the employer,
and wholly controlled by those parties. Union security fee arbitration is involuntary.
"The American Arbitration Association's Rules for Impartial Determination of Union Fees
(Effective June 1, 1986) thereinafter AAA Rut.E.s] provide for AAA appointment of the arbitrator
in cases it administers. AAA RULES, supra, Rule 3. The AAA provides a very valuable service by
appointing the arbitrator. Appointment by a neutral agency insulates the arbitrator from having a
personal interest in the outcome of the proceeding. The alternative, joint selection by the union
and the objectors, will be cumbersome at best and unworkable at worst. Individual objectors are
not likely to have sufficient experience to evaluate the qualifications of potential arbitrators. Where
there are many objectors it will be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to reach a consensus on
arbitrator selection.
Although the most common arrangement in grievance arbitration is for the parties to divide
the arbitrator's fee equally, it is not unheard of for one party to pay the entire fee. Sonic collective
bargaining agreements provide for the loser to pay the entire fee. Nonunion grievance systems that
culminate in arbitration often provide for the employer to pay the entire lee. For a discussion of
one such system, see Wolf, Trans World Airlines' Noncontract Grievance Procedure, 39 NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS PROC. 27-33 (1987).
An unresolved issue is whether the union could require the objectors to share responsibility
for the fee. The amount of money in dispute in a union security fee arbitration is often quite small.
Requiring objectors to share in the costs of the proceeding may substantially burden their rights to
object. One must assess the constitutionality of such a burden in light of the judiciary's general
approval of charging fees for access to first amendment forums only if the fees are reasonable and
proportionate to the added costs the activity poses and do not amount to a tax on the activity. See,
e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 116 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
577 (1941); Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050, 1055-57 (2d Cir.
1983); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124
(1982); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1370-72 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913
(1977); United States Labor Party v. Codd, 527 F.2d 118, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Central
Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1523 (11th Cir, 1985) (charges exceeding
a nominal amount are unconstitutional regardless of relationship to added expenses), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1120 (1986). See generally, Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 74 GEO. L.J. 257, 329-351 (1985).
as See, e.g., Damiano v. Matish, 830 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1987); Andrews v. Education Ass'n of
Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1987); Tierney v. City of Toledo, 824 F.2d 1497 (6th. Cir. 1987);
Robinson v. New jersey, 806 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2463 (1987); Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Midi'. 1986); Gilpin v. AFSCME, 643 F. Supp. 733
(C.D. Ill. 1986); McGlumphy v, Fraternal Order of Police, 633 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Ohio 1986);
Hewitt v. Board of Educ., No. 18577-D (Wisc. Emp. Rel. Comm'n slip op. filed Sept. 1, 1987);
United Univ. Professionals and Barry, N.Y.P.E.R.B. 920-3039 (1987).
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Judicial decisions have imposed it on the parties, and judicial precedent controls it."
Nevertheless, because grievance arbitration is so basic to the institution of labor arbitra-
tion, it provides an appropriate starting point and a basis of comparison in developing
the role of union security fee arbitration.
A. Grievance Arbitration
Grievance arbitration is a privately created and privately administered system under
which a dispute over the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agree-
ment. is submitted for resolution to an individual whose expertise, credentials and im-
partiality arc satisfactory' to both parties. The arbitrator, selected by the parties, is also
bound by their agreement and responsible to them for his or her work product. The
parties control the process itself but have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's award.
Thus, the arbitrator derives from the parties an institutional competence to resolve their
dispute — a competence that courts and administrative tribunals lack.-07
Arbitration plays a vital role in the process of industrial self-government. That
process begins with the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement., which usually
is effective for several years. During the term of the agreement, there inevitably will
arise issues that were not foreseen, disputes over the applicability of the agreement to
particular situations, disputes over the facts giving rise to particular applications of the
agreement, and matters that the parties deliberately left vague in the agreement because
they did not consider them to be sufficiently important to prevent reaching agreement
and they either expected or hoped that disputes over these matters would not actually
arise.
When these issues of contract interpretation or application arise, the parties attempt
to negotiate their resolution through the grievance procedure. If, however, they are
unable to settle a matter, their agreement to submit it to binding arbitration effectively
means that the contract means whatever the arbitrator says it means. 48 Arbitration thus
plays a small but vital role in the continuing process of collective bargaining between
employer and union. Arbitration creates a private common law of the workplace, based
on the parties' contract,'" but subject to change by the parties' subsequent agreement."
Collective bargaining agreements may be enforced through litigation, but arbitration
is the uniformly preferred alternative. Private control of the arbitration process insures
that it will be quicker and less expensive than litigation. !lone arbitrator is not available
to hear a case in a timely fashion, the parties may agree to select another arbitrator who
is. The parties may, and often do, control costs by dispensing- with briefs and transcripts,
and even by specifying the form and length of the arbitrator's award. Formal discovery,
" Of course, courts and state labor relations boards may also resolve union security fec disputes.
A union that relies on such procedures, however,-runs the risk that it will he held to not satisfy
Hudson. See, e.g., Hudson, 475 U,S. at 307-08 n.20; Gilpin, 643 F. Supp. at 737-38.
47 For a discussion of the role or private selection of the arbitrator and control of the process,
see Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 VALE L. J. 916, 926-31 (1979).
" See, e.g., United Pap erworkers Ind Union v. Misco, 108 S. Ct. 364, 370-71 (1987),
49 See generally Cox, Reflection Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 limtv. L. Rev. 1482 (1959); Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 (1955).
Even an agreement to overrule the arbitrator retroactively is valid under appropriate circum-
stances, See Snick Corp., 241
	
210, 216-20 (1979).
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one of the most expensive aspects of litigation, is rare in grievance arbitration. 51 Infor-
mation exchanges are informal, reinforced by the statutory duty to disclose relevant
information upon demand, unless the interests in confidentiality outweigh the interests
in disclosure.•
Grievance arbitration protects workplace peace by providing an alternative to the
threatened and actual use of economic weapons to resolve disputes that arise during the
term of the contract. The employer's agreement to binding arbitration is viewed as the
quid pro quo for the union's agreement not to strike." In his seminal presentation of a
general theory of the collective bargaining agreement, Professor Feller concluded that
the primary obligations assumed by the parties are to comply with the grievance and
arbitration machinery and to refrain from striking. 54
The process of grievance arbitt'ation may benefit the parties' relationship, even if
the grievance clearly lacks merit. The parties may bring the case to arbitration because
they deem it politically or otherwise preferable for the final responsibility for resolution
to rest with the arbitrator. 15 The hearing of the grievance may have therapeutic value,
even though there is little doubt as to its outcome.°°
B. Union Security Arbitration
Union security fee arbitration serves some private industrial relations interests that
are similar to those that its grievance counterpart serves. For example, it is common for
fee payers to file objections, not because they seek to challenge the union's claim that its
expenditures are chargeable, but because they are dissatisfied with the wisdom of those
expenditures or with the adequacy of representation that those expenditures have pur-
chased." Challenges on such grounds, though legally insufficient to state a cause of
action in court, are nevertheless processed through the objection and arbitration pro-
cedure. The processing of these objections may have therapeutic value in the workplace
similar to that which the processing of frivolous grievances provides.
Arbitration is preferable to litigation as a method for resolving security fee disputes.
Indeed, given the nature of a union security fee objection, its resolution through litigation
may be unworkable. Whereas complaints in lawsuits must contain brief statements pro-
viding the bases for their claims and must be based on reasonable beliefs in the claims,
5 ' See generally a FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE. IN LABOR ARBITRATION 137-46 (2d
ed. 1973); R. FLEMING, THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS 62-63 (1965). Nevertheless, the duty of
employers and unions to bargain in good faith requires that they supply each Cithei with information
relevant to contract administration. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967). At
least one prominent arbitrator and scholar has argued for formal prehearing discovery in labor
arbitration. Jones, The Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration —The Example of A rbilral Discovery,
116 U. PA. L. Rev. 830 (1968).
" See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 317-20 (1979).
55
 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
." Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 792-99
(1973).
55
 F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 12 (4th ed. 1985).
56 United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (citing Cox,
Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 ROCKY Mm. L. REV. 247, 261 (1958)).
" See, e.g., Local 46, Public Serv. Employees' Union and Campbell, slip op. at 4, 13 n.4, 16 n.6,
(March 18, 1987), (Nathan, Arb.).
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union security fee objectors need not state any bases for their objections. Moreover,
whereas complaints will proceed to trial only if there are disputed issues of material fact,
objections trigger a union's duty to prove to an impartial decisionmaker that its fee is
based only on chargeable expenditures. Objectors are not required to provide reasons
for triggering this duty. In fact, their reasons may be frivolous. Nevertheless, under
Hudson, the objector has a first amendment right to put the union to its proof."
Many of the practical advantages of grievance arbitration over breach of contract
litigation also apply to union security lee arbitration. The absence of formal discovery
and of other formal procedures, and the ability to demand priority from the arbitrator
in scheduling and issuing the award, enable union security fee arbitration to resolve
objections more quickly and more cheaply than litigation. Indeed, the expense of liti-
gation will usually greatly exceed the amount of fees in dispute. The absence of any
burden on the objector to state reasons for the objection effectively makes a fee contest
available upon demand by the objector. Absent an arbitration alternative, the costs of
administering a union security provision would threaten the provision's existence. Yet,
when a collective bargaining statute authorizes union security fees, the legislature has
determined that the stability, financial and otherwise, that a union attains by eliminating
"free riders" contribbtes tit positive labor relations." Union security fee arbitration helps
Secure these behefir's:
NeverthelesS; union security fee arbitration does not primarily function to further
the private purj se of efficiently administering the union security clause, while providing
a mechatiism for the cathartic venting of employees' frustrations with their exclusive
bargaining representative. Instead, it primarily Functions to further the public purpose
of resokiiig the tension between the first amendment rights of objectors and of non-
objectors. 6° Consequently, the development of a theory of the legal status of union
" Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 (1986). it appears that the
Court in Hudson rejected litigation as the principal means of resolving union security fee disputes.
Were litigation to be the principal dispute rescifution mechanism, an employee's objection would
force the union to sue for a judicial validation of its propoSed fee. The National Right to Work
Legal Defense Fund advocated this approach on behalf of the Hudson plaintiff's. The Right to Work
Fund argued that the union security fee was an employee debt and that mandatory payroll deduction
of the fee amounted to an unconstitutional prejudgment attachment of the employee's wages to
satisfy that debt. Id, Brief for the Respondents at 6-10. The Hudson Court's three-prong standard
clearly rejected this approach.
" See infra note 76 and accompanying text. The judiciary arid the legislature have recognized
the public interest in the exclusive bargaining representative's financial stability. See International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979); S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1959) (rejecting "destructive sanctions to a union," and "indirect sanctions such as penalizing the
union and its membership for malpractice Of its officers" for Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA) violations).
To the extent that union security fees encourage employees who would not otherwise do so to
join the union, they may provide for a more representative union. One study of an open shop
found that senior employees were far more likely to join the union than their junior colleagues.
jermier, Cohen, Powers & Gaines, Paying Dues: Police Unionism in a "Right-to-Work" Environment, 25
INous. REL. 265, 272 (1986). The result is not surprising. The initial direct economic benefits of
unionization may not outweigh the costs of initiation fees and dues. For the senior employee,
however, the added direct economic benefits of a union negotiated seniority system far outweigh
the costs of dues. See id.; Lentz, The Economics of the Decision to Join a Union, 1 J. LAB. RESEARCH
377, 381 (1980).
6' The Hudson Court effectively so stated: 'FF]he objective must be to devise a way of preventing
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security fee arbitration requires an understanding of the nature of these competing first
amendment rights.
Almost all union security litigation has focused on the objectors' rights. This litigation
has established that collection of a union security fee does not implicate objectors' rights.
Fee collection does not impose ideological conformity on employees opposed to the
union to any greater extent than does the requirement that employees accept a majority
union as their exclusive representative."' The union's duty to represent all employees
fair - 2ly" tempers the harshness of the exclusive representation rule." To the extent, if
any, that exclusive union representation and the collection of union security fees infringe
employees' freedom of association, such indirect infringement is justified by the govern-
ment's interest in stable and orderly labor relations. 64
In contrast. to lee collection, the expenditure of union security fees does implicate
objectors' rights. Where the union spends fees on political or ideological activities, it not
only forces employees to pay the costs of setting and administering their terms and
conditions of employment, but it also forces them to help finance political or ideological
causes with which they might disagree. If the expenditures do not relate to collective
bargaining, the coerced employee contributions are not contributing substantially to
stable labor relations. Thus, political and ideological expenditures unrelated to collective
bargaining directly infringe on employee first amendment rights and the government.
interest that might justify the infringement is minimal, at best."'
Although the Supreme Court consistently' has reiterated the above principles con-
cerning fee collection and expenditure, it has not been consistent or clear in expressing
its rationale. In its first consideration of the issue, Railway Employees' Departtnent v. Han-
son,66 the Court declared flatly that requiring "financial support of the collective -bar-
gaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work ... does not violate either the
First or the Fifth Amendments." 1'7 The Court reversed the judgment of the Nebraska
Supreme Court, which had held that the union shop agreement necessarily infringed
employees' first amendment right to freedom of association, particularly where the union
engaged in political activity with which employees might disagree." The Hanson Court
compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees who object thereto without restricting
the Union's ability to require every employee to contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining
activities.'" 475 U.S. at 302 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 237 (1977)). As
developed infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text, to the extent that an objection procedure
restricts the Union's ability to require objectors to contribute to the costs of collective bargaining, it
restrains the rights of nonobjectors to engage in political and ideological activity.
61 See Railway Employees' Delft. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964);
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192, 199-203 (1944).
The first Supreme Court cases that recognized the duty of fair representation did so, in part,
to avoid constitutional attacks on the exclusive representation principle. See generally M. MAL.IN ,
INDIVIDUAL RIGH'rS THE UNION 347-49 (1988).
"Abood, 431 U.S. at 222-23; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760
(1961).
65 About& 431 U.S. at 234-35; Street, 367 U.S. at 768-69.
66 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
"7 Id. at 238.
6" Hanson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 160 Neb. 669, 697, 71 N.W.2d 526, 546 (1955), rev'd, 351
U.S. 225 (1956).
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did not equate forcing employees to contribute financially to the costs of their collective
bargaining representation with unconstitutional forced ideological conformity. 69 It re-
served the issue of whether political expenditures over objection would infringe the
objectors' rights.'"
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court faced a union security fee that a
public employer and a public sector union had imposed. 7 ' The Court rejected the
argument that union security in public employment differed from union security in
private employment and applied Hanson in holding that an agency shop fee was not
inherently unconstitutional:72 The Court held, however, that a public sector union con-
stitutionally could not spend objecting employees' fees on political or ideological activity
that did not involve their representation in collective bargaining."
The Court's reasoning in Abood injected considerable ambiguity into the conceptual
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of union security fees. First the Court.
reaffirmed Hanson's holding that union security fees do not infringe on first amendment.
interests and went out of its way to support. Hanson's continuing validity against attack
by three concurring justices: 74 Immediately thereafter, however, the Court suggested
that union security fees necessarily have an impact upon first amendment interests, even
when their use is limited to supporting collective bargaining activities. It cited as examples
of this first amendment impact. potential employee ideological objections to such union
negotiated contract provisions as a health insurance plan's coverage of abortion, a no
strike clause, a wage scale thought to be inflationary or an anti-discrimination clause."
The Court opined that, in light of these examples, union security fees "might well be
thought ... to interfere with an employee's freedom to associate for the advancement
of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, ... Mut such interference, as exists is constitu-
tionally justified by the legislative assessment" of the union shop's importance to labor
relations."
The ambiguity arises from the Court's characterization of fees expended on collec-
tive bargaining activity as having an "impact," or being thought to "interfere" with the
first amendment right of freedom of association. It is not clear if the Court meant that
such fees would violate the first amendment absent the counterbalancing government
interests in orderly labor relations. Although the Court's language suggests this conclu-
sion, its defense of Hanson immediately preceding this discussion of the "impact." of
collective bargaining expenditures or' freedom of association suggests the opposite be-
cause the Hanson Court dismissed the claim of interference with first amendment rights
without suggesting any need to balance such rights against government interests sup-
porting the union shop.
Clarification of this ambiguity is essential to determining the scope of a permissible
union security fee. If the fee does not interfere with first amendment rights unless the
union spends it on political or ideological activity unrelated to collective bargaining, the
" 351 U.S. at 238.
70 id ,
431 U.S. 209, 212 (1977).
72
 Id. at 224, 232.
7s
	 at 235, The Court previously reached the same result through statutory interpretation of
the Railway Labor Act in International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
T4 431 U.S. at 220 & n.13.
"Id. at 222.
76 Id. (footnote omitted).
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union need not justify expenditures that are neither political nor ideological. If, however,
the fee is permitted only to the extent that the interests in orderly labor relations
outweigh the interferences with freedom of association, the union must justify every
expenditure in terms of its collective bargaining function."
Clarification of the Abood ambiguity is also necessary to determine the rigor with
which a court or arbitrator must scrutinize union expenditures. If the fee interferes with
freedom of association, such interference must be justified by a compelling state interest
and must be tailored narrowly so that it is no greater than what is necessary to effectuate
that interest:78 If, however, no interference with first amendment rights arises unless the
expenditures are political or ideological, then a court or arbitrator will review all other
expenditures, if at all, under a reasonable or rational relationship test.
The Court had an opportunity to clarify the Abood ambiguity when it faced a variety
of challenged union expenditures in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship
Clerks." Instead of clarifying the issue, however, the Court further muddied the waters.
The Ellis Court characterized the union security fee as "a significant impingement on
First Amendment rights ... justified by the governmental interest in industrial peace."8°
But the Court did not require the union to establish that it had narrowly tailored the
challenged expenditures to advance the compelling interest in industrial peace. It held,
in a constitutionally based interpretation of the Railway Labor Act, that a union may
charge objectors for expenditures that are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purposes of performing the duties of an exclusive representative." 81
77 In Hudson, the Seventh Circuit viewed the fair share fee as inherently infringing on the
objector's liberty interest in free association. 743 F.2d at 1193. Although such a deprivation of
liberty could be constitutionally justified by the government's interests in orderly labor relations, in
the court's view, it could not occur witliOut affording the objector a due process hearing replete
With procedural safeguards. Id. at 1192-93. In the t Otift's view, those safeguards were needed to
confine the fee to collective bargaining expenditurCi regardless of whether they were political or
ideological. Id. at 1192.
The Supreme Court majority found it unnecessary to address the Seventh Circuit's deprivation
of liberty analysis and its underlying view that even noriiiblitical and H
udson, 
expenditures
are Unconstitutional unless they are germane to colledive bargaining: H 475 U.S. at 299-301,
In a concurring opinion, Justice White, joined by Chief Jiistice burger, labelled the Seventh Circuit's
view "joinder our cases ... very questionable." Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring). Nevertheless, the
Sixth Circuit has read Hudson as holding that any security fee infringes the first amendment rights
of objectors and that the union is entitled only to those monies that will be spent on collective
bargaining activity regardless of whether the expenditure is ideological. Tierney v. City of Toledo,
824 F.2d 1497, 1504-05 (6th Cir. 1987); But see Andrews V. Education Assn of Cheshire, 829 F.2d
335, 339 (2d Cir. 1987) (characterizing nonmembers' first amendment right as "not to be coerced
to contribute funds to support political activities that they do not wish to support").
The difference in amount between a fee that merely excludes political and ideological expen-
ditures unrelated to collective bargaining arid one that is strictly limited to collective bargaining
expenditures can be quite substantial. See Clark, A Guide to the Changing Court Rulings on Union
Security in the Public Sector: A Management Perspective, 14 J.L. & EDUC. 71, 73 (1985).
" See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Brown v. Socialist Workers
'74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 463 (1958).
'9 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
80 Id. at 455-56.
81 Id. at 448. The Court elaborated:
Under this standard, objecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share of
not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a collective bargaining
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The Court applied this seemingly lenient standard with inconsistent degrees of
strictness in evaluating specific expendilures. The Court broadly approved union insti-
tutional expenditures, allowing charges for the full costs of conventions and social
activities even though political activities were undertaken at those conventions, arid
allowing charges for union publications as long as they were prorated to exclude charges
for political messages in those publications.82 In contrast, the Court took a very strict
view of the degree to which a union may charge for litigation expenses, limiting those
charges to cases directly involving bargaining unit employees." The Court questioned
charges for litigating the validity of an airline industry mutual aid pact," even though
the pact strengthened airline employers' ability to respond to strikes and thereby lessened
the union's bargaining power."5
contract and of settling grievances and disputes, but also the expenses of activities or
undertakings normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the duties
of' the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit.
Id. The Court's standard of expenditures reasonably or necessarily incurred as exclusive bargaining
representative may permit differing levels of scrutiny, depending on whether the inquiry is into
the reasonableness or necessity of the expenditures. See DuQuoin Educ. Ass'n and Bosecker, 4
111064 at IX-254—IX-256 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd. 1988).
82 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448-50.
" Id, at 453.
84 Id.
" Ellis, 685 F.2d 1065, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court also disallowed any charges for
organizing outside the employees' bargaining unit, finding that such activity affords only the most
attenuated benefits to the already organized fee payers and was beyond the scope of the free rider
rationale, 466 U.S. at 451. In so finding the Court did not even discuss the generally recognized
view that unions have legitimate concerns with the wages and working conditions existing at
competitors of employers whom they have organized. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (recognizing that the nunstatutory antitrust
exemption may protect a union's legitimate interest in eliminating competition based on substandard
wages and working conditions); 2 TuF., DEvELoPiNG LABOR Law 1078 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983)
(discussing legitimate union concerns that union standards not be undermined in the context of
what picketing is outlawed by § 8(h)(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 58(b)(7)).
Instead, the Court relied on Railway Labor Act (RLA) legislative history, observing in particular
that B.R.A.C.'s president had assured Congress that unions were not seeking union shop agreements
for the purpose of strengthening their collective bargaining power. 466 U.S. at 451. The Ellis
Court's disallowance of charges for organizing expenses thus appears to be routed in the RLA and
should not govern the constitutionality of such charges in the public sector.
Although public sector employers do not compete in a way that makes employers with sub-
standard wages or working conditions an economic threat to organized employers, the case for
allowing public sector unions to charge objectors for organizing expenses is actually stronger than
in the private sector. Most public sector unions do not have the right to strike. See generally Hanslowe
& Acierno, The Law and Theory of Strikes by Government Employees, 67 CoitN1w, L. REV. 1055, 1059-
60 (1982). State statutes commonly provide interest arbitration in place of strikes as the ultimate
method of impasse resolution. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1984) (police officers, firefighters,
jail and correctional institution personnel, and hospital workers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-473,
7-473c (West. Supp. 1988) (municipal employees); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 19, § 1310 (1985) (state and
local workers); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Stipp, 1984) (state and local personnel); 1LL. REV. STAT.
ch. 48, paras. 1607, 1614(g), 1712 (1987) (certain correctional facility employees, police officers,
fire fighters and educational personnel); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-13(c) (Burns 1985) (certificated
school employees); Iowa Coin: ANN. § 90.15 (West 1984) (firefighters); Iowa CODE ANN. § 20.22
(West 1978) (state and local workers); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. fit. 26, § 965(4) (Supp. 1983) (local
government workers); ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. Lit. 26, § 979-1)(4) (1974) (state employees); Me. Rev.
Suer. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026(4) (Supp. 1983) (university personnel); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. C11. 150E,
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A proper resolution of the Abood ambiguity requires examination of different types
of union collective bargaining expenditures. Most expenditures of union security lees in
the collective bargaining process -merely require employees to subsidize the costs of
setting their terms and conditions of employment. The examples of first amendment
infringements the Abood Court cited concerned terms and conditions of employment
with which employees might disagree."" These terms and conditions do not infringe
employees' lirst amendment rights when they are negotiated with an exclusive bargaining
representative any more than they would if the employer promulgated them unilaterally.
The possible first amendment infringements raised in Abood arise from the principle of
exclusive representation, rather than the exaction of a union security fee. Exclusive
representation, however, is a legitimate method for a public employer to use in estab-
lishing terms and conditions o1 employment and does not infringe on first amendment
rights.87 When the exclusive representative and employer agree that all employees in the
§ 9 (West 1982) (state and local employees); Mica. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.231-423.240 (West
1978) (police and firefighters); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179A.16 (West Supp. 1988) (essential employ-
ees); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-31-310 (state and local personnel), §§ 39-34-101-106 (firefighters)
(1987); NEE. REv. STAT. §§ 48-810-819.01 (1984) (state and local personnel); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 288.200 (Stipp. 1987) (local government employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:12 (1987)
(state and local workers); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-7 (state and local personnel), 34:13A-16(c)
(police anti firefighters) (West 1988); N.M. STATE PERSONNEL BD. RECULATIONS § I4(c), 2 Pub.
Bargaining Cas. (CCH) 1124,519 (state employees); N.V. Civ, SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney 1983)
(state and local employees); Oitio REv. CODE ANN. § 4117.14(C)(1) (Baldwin 1983) (state and local
employees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 51 - 101- 113 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987) (police and fire-
lighters); OB. REV. STAT. §§ 243.712(2)(c) (state and local personnel), 243.742 (police, firefighters,
and guards at mental and correctional institutions) (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.4 (Purdon
Stipp. 1987) (police and firefighters); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.1-7 (1979) (firefighters), 28.9.2-7
(1979) (police), 28-9.3-9 (1979) (teachers), 28-9.4-10 (1979) (municipal workers), 28-9.5-7 (Supp.
1983) (state police), 36-11-9 (1984) (state employees); TEX. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-I, §§ 9-
15 (Vernon 1987) (police and firefighters); VT. STAT. ANN. lit. 3. § 925 (1985) (state workers), tit.
§ 1733 (1987) (local government employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.450 (Supp. 1988)
(police and firefighters); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(4)(CM) (Milwaukee police), 111.77 (non-Mil-
waukee police and firefighters) (West 1988); Wyo. STAT. §§ 27.10-101-109 (1987) (firefighters).
Even where the right to strike is granted, political pressures and other factors may lead the
parties to voluntarily employ interest arbitration to avoid or settle a strike. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch .
48 V§ 1618 (requiring arbitration where a court has ordered striking public employees back to
work), 1713 (prohibiting strikes if the parties have agreed to use interest arbitration) (1987). In
interest arbitration the principal factor on which arbitrators most commonly rely is how the wages
and working conditions of the bargaining unit at issue compare to those of other employers.
Anderson, Presenting an Interest Arbitration Case: An Arbitrator's View, 3 LAB. L.J. 745, 750 (1987);
Laner & Manning, Interest Arbitration: A New Terminal Impasse Resolution Procedure for Illinois Public
Sector Employees, 60 Cut. KENT L. REv. 839, 856-57 (1984); Weitzman & Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbitrators
Toward Final-Offer Arbitration in New Jersey, 35 ARB. J., Mar. 1980, at 25, 31-32. Thus union
organizing efforts in other bargaining units, resulting in improved wages and working conditions,
can have an impact on wages and working conditions in the fee payers' bargaining unit that is more
direct than in the private sector.
" See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
87
 Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287-91 (1984). justice
Brennan, who dissented in Knight, agrees with the general proposition that exclusive representation
does not infringe on first amendment rights..City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 177-78 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The examples of first amendment infringements Abood cited are simply products of the exclu-
sive representation collective bargaining process. A fee payer's alleged compelled association with
abortion, no strike pledges and wage increases results nut from the union security fee, but from
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bargaining unit should subsidize the cost of the process of establishing and administering
terms and conditions of employment, no inherent infringement of free association rights
results, and a broad standard of reasonableness should govern the scope of permissible
charges.
Some expenditures, however, while effectuating the union's status as exclusive bar-
gaining representative, are clearly political or ideological, and infringe on objectors' first
amendment rights. For example, the Mood Court recognized that the collective bargain-
ing process in the public sector extends beyond the bargaining table and grievance
hearing room into the appropriate legislative body." To effectuate their representational
duties, public sector unions frequently must lobby legislative bodies to ratify collective
bargaining agreements and to appropriate sufficient funding. Required legislative rati-
fication of a collective bargaining agreement changes the nature of the union's activity
from participation in the administrative establishment of terms and conditions of em-
ployment to lobbying on an issue open for political debate. Dissenting employees have
the fee payees being hound by the contract negotiated by the union. The establishment of terms
and conditions of employment, whether through collective bargaining or by unilateral employer
action, does not compel ideological conformity. The union security fee plays an intimate role in
funding the collective bargaining exclusive representation process. The union's status as exclusive
representative creates its need for and legitimizes its claim to the union security fee. See Orr, The
Free Rider and Labor Law: hdroduction and Overview, 1 J. LAB. Res. 285, 286-88 (1980). One cannot
distinguish the constitutional validity of the fee from the constitutional validity of the exclusive
representation principle.
Professor Harpaz, however, has argued that a union security fee for collective bargaining
expenditures cannot he distinguished in a constitutionally significant way from a union security fee
far political expenditures. Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to
Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. Rev. 817, 864-67 (1986). She contends that there is no
difference between the two in their degree of offensiveness to the individual employee. She main-
tains that fees for collective bargaining activity discourage individuality to a greater extent than fees
for political expenditures. Id. at 864. Fees for political expenditures leave employees free to oppose
union political causes and may even motivate employees to more active opposition. Id. at 867, Fees
for collective bargaining activity force employees into dependency on the union, requiring them to
work with the union to have their personal views taken into account. Id. at 866.
Professor Harpaz is correct that there are many incentives for an employee who wishes to
become involved in the workplace to join the .union. Although the duty of fair representation places
some limits on a union's ability to exclude nonmembers from collective bargaining decisionmaking,
see Branch 600(1, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811-13 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
only union members have the right to run and vote in union elections, '19 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1982).
Unions usually limit contract ratification votes to members, a limitation that has received judicial
approval. See Maurer v, UAW, 105 L.R.R.M. 2883, 2887 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Daigle v. Jefferson Parish
School Bd., 345 So. 2d 583 (La. App.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 260 (La. 1977); Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Bd. v. Eastern Lancaster County Educ. Ass'n, 58 Pa. Cotnmw. 78, 83-88, 427 A.2d 305,
308-10 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982). But see American Postal Workers Union, Head-
quarters Local 2885 v. American Postal Workers Union, 113 L.R.R,M. 2433, 2434 (D.D.C. 1982),
aff 'd mem., 766 F.2d 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 (1986).
This encouragement of union membership, however, does not result from the imposition of
union security fees. Rather, it results from the union's collective bargaining activity. It is likely to
result whenever an employer recognizes a union, even if the recognition is not exclusive. For
example, prior to the enactment of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, several public employers
in central and southern Illinois recognized unions as bargaining representatives for their members
only. In practice, these employers unilaterally imposed the terms reached in negotiation with the
union on the nonunion employees. Moreover, there is no first amendment right implicated in the
setting of wages, hours and working conditions.
88 431  U.S. at 236.
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first amendment free speech rights to lobby legislative officials to reject the agreement. 89
Compelling these employees to subsidize their union's lobbying efforts in support of
ratification directly infringes their free speech rights. Although the government's interest
in labor peace may be strong enough constitutionally to justify this infringement, the
scope of permissible charges must be drawn narrowly to limit the infringement to that
which is necessary to promote that interest.
The distinction between a very broad range of chargeable expenditures that involve
only the setting and administering of terms and conditions of employment and a very
narrow range that infringe free speech rights may explain the apparent inconsistencies
in Ellis. Such union institutional expenditures as conventions and social activities facilitate
the union's ability to carry out its role as bargaining representative and impose no
ideological conformity on dissenting employees. 2° Litigation, however, is a means of
petitioning the government that the first amendment protects. 8 ' Consequently, compelled
subsidization of union litigation directly infringes objectors' corresponding first amend-
ment right to refrain from litigation. The need to tailor this infringement narrowly
mandates that the range of litigation expenditures chargeable to objectors be limited to
those directly involving bargaining unit employees.
Union security fee arbitration thus serves the public purpose of protecting the
objectors' first amendment rights to be free of compelled subsidization of such union
political and ideological activities as lobbying, litigation and support for candidates for
public office except where the activity is directly related to the union's function as
bargaining representative. The constitutionally significant role of the fee arbitration,
however, is not limited to safeguarding objectors' rights. The procedure also safeguards
the rights of union members and nonobjecting fee payers.
Nondissenting employees have first amendment rights to associate as a union and
to pool their resources to support political and ideological causes. 92
 The filing of an
objection, however, temporarily restrains these rights. When employees object to the
amount of their union security fees, the union must place the fees in escrow to insure
that objectors' money will not be used, even temporarily, for nonchargeable political and
ideological purposes. 93
 The escrow, however, temporarily deprives the union of access
to funds that will be used for chargeable expenditures. The union's deprivation of funds
to which it will ultimately be entitled should not exceed that which is reasonably necessary
to protect the dissenting employees' rights not to subsidize objectionable expenditures.
The Hudson Court recognized the need for this limitation in holding that a union need
3U
 Madison Joint School District, 929 U.S. at 175.
9u In her concurring opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), Justice
O'Connor interpreted Abood as distinguishing union collective bargaining activity as commercial
association outside the first amendment from union political activities as ideological association
within the first amendment. Id. at 638 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She characterized Ellis as a case
that applied the commerciabideological 'association distinction to the specific expenditures at issue.
Id. For an argument that even political expenditures of union security fees should not violate the
first amendment, see Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRF. DAME L. REV. 61, 70-76
(1983).
91
 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31, 437 (1963).
U2 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1968).
93 See supra notes 22, 39-40 and accompanying text.
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not escrow that portion of the fee that an independent audit establishes to be beyond
reasonable dispute."
Even when the union reduces the escrow as Hudson permits, the union will usually
he temporarily deprived of some funds to which it ultimately will be found to be entitled.
These eventual entitlements will include an escrow cushion against arithmetic errors and
funds representing expenditures reasonably disputed, but ultimately found to be charge-
able.
During the period that the union escrows the objectors' fees, it must temporarily
divert fees that the union supporters have paid, and that should be available for political
and ideological purposes, to cover chargeable expenditures. The longer objectors' fees
remain in escrow, the greater the infringement on non-objectors' first amendment rights.
A reasonably prompt arbitration procedure minimizes this infringement. Thus, union
security fee arbitration serves the public purpose of maintaining an appropriate balance
between the rights of objecting employees and the rights of other employees and of the
union.
Recognition of the primarily public purpose of union security fee arbitration merely
lays the foundation for discerning the legal status of the procedure. An arbitrator can
act only if he or she has the authority to act. Identifying the source of that authority is
crucial to determining the procedure's legal status.
III. TUE SOURCE OF"I'llE ARBITRATOR'S Au-mourn'
Although the Hudson Court indicated that arbitration can fulfill a union's duty to
provide a reasonably prompt neutral resolution to employees' objections, it offered no
comment on the source of the arbitrator's authority, Shortly after the Hudson decision,
the American Arbitration Association adopted special rules governing the arbitration of
union fee disputes. 95 Unfortunately, these rules also fail to address the authority issue.
The AAA Rules require only a request from the union for the AAA to appoint an
arbitrator." The rules do not require the employees' consent, and expressly permit the
hearing to proceed in the absence of any party who was given due notice.0
If objecting employees agree to arbitrate their objections, that agreement serves as
the source of the arbitrator's authority. If an arbitrator is to proceed ex parte and without
the objectors' consent, as the AAA Rules authorize, however, the source of arbitral
authority must be clearly delineated.
The first post-Hudson arbitration of fair share fees charged by the American Fed-
eration of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) in Illinois illustrates the
need to delineate the source of the arbitrator's authority." The arbitrator's opinion
reveals that ninety-five nonmembers in bargaining units that AFSCME locals represented
94 "We need not hold, however, that a 100% escrow is constitutionally required. Such a remedy
has the serious defect of depriving the Union of access to some escrowed funds that it is unques'
tionably entitled to retain." Hudson, 475 U.S. at 310.
95 See supra note 44.
96 AAA RULES, supra note 44, Rule 2.
97 id. Rule 13.
98 Denham and AFSCME Council 31, AAA Case No. 51673-000-1-86-L, slip op. (Nov. 29, 1986)
(Duda, Arb.) thereinafter AFSCME-Illinois Award].
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objected to the amounts of their fair share fees." AFSCME invoked the American
Arbitration Association's procedures, and AAA appointed an arbitrator.'"
The arbitrator and AFSCME took numerous steps to facilitate the objectors' partic-
ipation in the hearing. They scheduled several hearing dates, including Saturdays, in
Chicago and Springfield. AFSCME made its documentary evidence available for inspec-
tion by the objectors for several weeks prior to the hearing.m The arbitrator invited
objectors and the union to submit prehearing written statements. The arbitrator also
sent notice of all procedures to each objector and advised each of his or her right to
participate in the hearing, cross-examine union witnesses and present evidence.
Despite these efforts, only thirteen objectors appeared, and only eight actively made
presentations at the hearings." The arbitrator's award purports to bind all ninety-five
objectors and also orders prospective relief for nonmembers who failed to object." The
arbitrator, however, did not address the source of his authority to bind objectors other
than those who, by their appearance at the hearing, consented to the proceeding.
Although two state agencies with jurisdiction over Illinois public employees have re-
viewed the award, neither has addressed the authority issue. 104
Except where compelled by statute, arbitration is a voluntary process the parties
resort to by agreement. The contract alone determines the scope of the arbitrator's
authority.'" Although the parties to the arbitration need not always be the original
parties to the agreement, they must be bound by the agreement to arbitrate for the
arbitrator to have authority to resolve their dispute."'
The source of the union security fee arbitrator's authority, accordingly, must be the
collective bargaining agreement. No other agreement binds the objectors. In some cases,
the collective bargaining agreement will expressly detail the union security fee objection
procedure, and no issue concerning the arbitrator's authority will arise. These cases will
probably be rare. Employers tend Co view the dispute over union security fees as one
that is limited to the union and the employees, and are reluctant to become involved in
developing the ke objection procedure.")
161 1d. at 19.
'''" Id. at 20,21.
191 Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22, we also AFSCME Council 48, slip op. (May 13, 1987) (Weisberger, Arb.) (none of
the objectors participated in the proceeding).
'"3 Id. at 100.
Rochon and AFSCME Council 31, 3 P.E.R.1. 113031 (111. Local Lab. Rd. Bd. 1987); Lovell
and AFSCME, No. 86-ES-11051-S Educ. Lab. Rd. Bd. Executive Director, March 9, 1987); Linde
and AFSCME, No. 86-FS-0014-C (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rd. Bd. Executive Director, March 9, 1987).
1 "5
 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
1°6
 For example, in appropriate cases, arbitrators may have authority over successor employers.
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964). Similarly where a dispute arises under
the contract between an employer and one union but potentially affects rights under a contract
between the employer and a second union, the arbitrator may have authority over the second
union. CBS v. American Recording & Broadcasting Ass'n, 293 F. Supp. 1400, 1402-03 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 1326, 1329 (2d Cir. 1969).
107 Bra me Kay, Reinhold & Artdreola, Legal Problems in Administering Agency Shop Agreements —
A Management Perspective, 13 J.L. & Emir:. 01 (1984) (recognizing that the real dispute in union
security cases is between union and fee payer but suggesting that because the employer can be
dragged into the battle, the employer should negotiate fee objection procedures into the collective
bargaining agreement).
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In other cases, the collective bargaining agreement may expressly refer to the union's
fee objection procedure. These cases may occur with increasing frequency. Employers
usually insist on "wall-to-wall" indemnification clauses, in which the union agrees to hold
the employer harmless for liability and costs incurred in defending union security fee
contests." In light of Hudson, indemnification clauses may begin to contain recitals in
which the union recognizes its obligation to provide procedural safeguards for fee payers.
Collective bargaining agreements often refer expressly to documents beyond the
four corners of the contract. These documents include employer-generated work rules
and union-generated rules governing priority in hiring hall referrals. Express references
in collective bargaining agreements to union generated fee objection procedures certainly
empower an arbitrator to resolve fee challenges in accordance with those procedures.
In many, and perhaps most, cases, however, the collective bargaining agreement will
not refer expressly to the ice objection procedure. The union, recognizing that it must
provide a procedure that meets the Hudson standards as a prerequisite to collecting any
fee, will establish and implement one unilaterally. Even in these cases, for the reasons
developed below, the collective bargaining agreement should serve to empower the
arbitrator to resolve the fee dispute.
Although most view the administration of union security fees as primarily a union
concern, the employer may not divorce irself from the issue."'" The potential infringe-
ment on employees' first amendment rights results front the nature of the employer,
not From the nature of the union. The state action necessary to implicate the first
amendment exists because the union security clause is part of a contract with a govern-
ment entity that requires payment of the Fee as a condition of retaining public employ-
ment.
Indeed, in Hudson the Seventh Circuit held that the employer had the primary duty
to resolve the fee dispute."" That burden has been relieved by the Supreme Court's
approval of arbitration as a fee dispute resolution procedure."' What remains is the
employer's burden to ensure that a constitutionally adequate procedure is in place, even
if the employer plays no role in its development or administration.
A union security clause in a contract. with a public employer must provide for an
objection procedure that complies with the Hudson standards, or else it is unconstitu-
tional. When a contract is susceptible to two interpretations, one that renders the contract.
unenforceable and another that renders it enfbrceable, the latter interpretation usually
should prevail. 12
 Thus, where the contract is silent concerning union security fee objec-
1 " 8 See Clark, A Guide to the Changing Court Rulings on Union Security in ihe Public Sector: A
Management Perspective, 14 J.L. & Eouc. 71, 83 (1985) (recommending that employers include such
indemnification language in the union contract).
10" In Hudson, the Court. characterized the defective procedures it found as "used by the Chicagt
Teachers UMon and approved by the Chicago Board of Education ...." 475 U.S. at 302. An
indemnification clause shifts liability as between the entployer and the union. but cannot affect the
employer's constitutional duty to dissenting employees. Dixon v. City of Chicago, 609 F. Stipp. 851
(N.D. Ill. 1987).
n" Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1194.
"f See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
" 2 See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Vickers Refining Co., 414 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1969); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 71 Cal, App. 492, 497, 236 P. 210, 213 (1925); Perbal v.
Daeor Mfg. Corp., 436 S.W.2d 677, 689 (Mo. 1968); Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 75 Lab.
Arb. (11NA) 1038, 1040 (1980) (Shearer, Arh.); Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 109,
i 12 (1978) (Snow, Arb.).
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lion procedures, but the union has implemented constitutionally adequate procedures,
those procedures should be implied into the contract. To accomplish this, it should be
implied that the parties have delegated to the union the task of developing adequate
procedures in the first instance. When the union develops those procedures, they become
part of the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
This approach of implying the union's fee objection procedures into the collective
bargaining ,agreement requires that the union security clause be interpreted in the
context of first amendment law as developed in Hudson. A debate has raged for several
decades among arbitrators and scholars over the use of "external law" in interpreting
collective bargaining agreements.'" This debate, however, should not preclude reliance
on first amendment law in interpreting union security clauses.
The debate over use of external law focuses on the role of the arbitrator. Those
who contend that arbitrators should confine their awards to the contract, and not take
external law into account, argue that the parties are submitting their dispute for con-
tractual interpretation, and not legal opinion,' 11 They further maintain that interpreta-
tion of external law is beyond the arbitrator's authority and expertise." 5 They urge that
if the arbitrator's award forces a party to violate the law, it is up to the courts to deny
enforcement of the award." 5
Whether a union-generated fee objection procedure should be implied into an
otherwise silent union security claiise in the collective bargaining agreement is an issue
of arbitral authority. Issues of substantive arbitrahility are issues for the courts, rather
than for the arbitrators.[" This minimizes, and perhaps totally eliminates, the danger
of inexpert or unauthorized arbitrators interpreting external law. 15 Moreover, in decid-
ing issues of arbitrability, courts presume that a given dispute is arbitrable. 115 To over-
come that presumption, the court must be able to state with positive assurance that the
dispute is beyond the arbitrator's authority. When presented with a "silent" union security
clause and a union-generated fee objection procedure, a court cannot be positive that
an employee's fee objection is not arbitrable.
The employer's reaction to a union-generated fee objection procedure may
strengthen the case for constructively incorporating it into a collective bargaining agree-
ment's union security clause. Where the employer collects the fee through mandatory
payroll deductions, the employee owes a constitutional duty to the employees not to
make such deductions absent an adequate fee objection procedure.'" By making payroll
deductions, the employer indicates its approval of the union's procedure. This approval
strengthens the implication of the procedure into the collective bargaining agreement.
"' For the views of the three leading principals in the debate, see Howlett, The Arbitrator, the
NLRB and the Courts, 20 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS PRoc. 67, 83-103 (1967); Meltzer,
Rumination About ideology, Law, and Arbitration, 20 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS PROC. 1,
14-19 (1967); Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, 21 NATIONAL AcAnEntv or ARBITRATORS
PROC. 42 (1968).
114 Mittenthal, supra note 113, at 49.
115 Id. at 48.
" M. at 54-55.
A.T.8c T. Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 699 (1986).
The issue whether to infer a union's fee objection procedure most likely will arise in court
proceedings in which a party seeks to compel arbitration or to collaterally attack the award.
115 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
120 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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If the union accomplishes its fee collection through threat of discharge for nonpay-
ment, the employer's role is more passive unless and until the ,union demands an
employee's termination. Nevertheless, the employer continues to owe employees a con-
stitutional duty to ensure the existence of adequate objection procedures. An employer's
failure to object to union collection efforts suggests at least constructive employer ap-
proval of the union's procedure. This approval also strengthens the implication of the
procedure into the collective bargaining agreement,
Thus, regardless of whether the collective bargaining agreement expressly refers to
the union security fee arbitration procedure, the agreement provides the source of the
arbitrator's authority. This concluSion influences the relationship between union security
fee arbitration and litigation. That relationship is explored in Sections IV and V below.
IV. MAY AN OBJECTOR BYPASS THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE?
The Hudson decision held only that employees must be provided with a procedure
that results in a reasonably prompt, impartial resolution of their objeetions. 121 The
Hodson Court did not state whether employees must use the procedure. In a concurring
opinion, justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger, suggested that employees may
be required to exhaust arbitration remedies prior to filing suit. 122 Prohibiting employees
from bypassing arbitration raises four issues: whether there is authority to bind the
employee to use arbitration, whether such a requirement is consistent with section 1983
of the J$71 Civil Rights Act, whether such a requirement is consistent with existing ease
law governing fee objections, and whether it is constitutionally, permissible to specify the
form an objection must take.ms
A. Is the objector bound to arbitrate?
Typically, the union drafts the fee objection procedure, and its executive board or
other governing body approves the procedure in accordance with the union's constitution
and bylaws. A union's constitution is a contract between the union and its mernbers. 124
Members are bound to abide by the constitution and all rules promulgated thereunder.' 25
The most common union Security provision in the public sector is the agency shop
or fair share fee. Objecting fee payers cannot be union members. Therefore, the union's
constitution or rules specifying the method for resolving fee disputes cannot bind
them. t26
w gee
 supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Hudson; 475 U.S, at 311 (White, J., concurring).
' 13 The ability to bypass arbitration may also be significant for the bbjector who arbitrates and
then successfully attacks the arbitration award in section 1983 litigation. If the objector could have
bypassed arbitration, the court may deny the objector attorneys' fees expended in the arbitration.
The court probably will award attorneys' fees if resort to arbitration is mandatory. Compare New
York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980) (attorneys' fees awarded for administrative
proceedings pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act) with Webb v. Dyer County LW. of Edue.,
471 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1985) (attorneys' fees not awarded for administrative proceedings pursuant
to section 1983, and expressly distinguishing Carey because the administrative proceeding in Carey
was reqUired by statute).
1 2' M. MAL1N, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 4 & n.11 (1988).
125 See generally id. at 4-22.
1 2" Cf. Soto Segarra v. Sea•Land Serv.,:Inc., 581 F.2d 291, '295 (1st Cir. 1978); Mendicki v.
International Union, UAW, 61 L.R.R.M. 2142, 2143 (D. Kan. 1965). But see Reid v. International
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Even in union shops where all employees are members, objectors may not be bound
by union rules on fee objections. The only membership requirement that a union may
impose on employees is payment of that portion of dues that supports chargeable
expenditures. 127 Compliance with the union constitution, bylaws or rules is not a mem-
bership obligation on which a union may insist once a "member" makes known his or
her objection to doing anything other than making the minimum payment.
The collective bargaining agreement, however, binds all employees, regardless of
membership status. Moreover, because a court should interpret the collective bargaining
agreement in a manner that preserves the agreement's constitutionality, it must read the
union security clause to authorize charging objectors only those fees that do not infringe
their first amendment rights. Thus, a lee objection that challenges the fee amount the
union is seeking to charge, in essence, alleges a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement. If the fee objection procedure is expressly or innpliedly incorporated into
the contract, arbitration provides the remedy for the alleged breach. Although this
alleged breach and its remedy differ in several respects from the traditional grievance,
those differences do not justify treating this procedure differently from the arbitration
remedies collective bargaining agreements traditionally provide to resolve union griev-
ances against the employer.
One such difference arises because the objection, in effect, alleges a proposed union
breach of contract that the arbitration procedure will prevent. It is expenditure of the
fee on nonchargeable items that violates the first amendment and, by implication, the
contract. Under Hudson, the objection automatically triggers the escrowing of at least
that portion of the objector's fee that can reasonably be disputed. The escrow prevents
the union from immediately spending the fee, and thereby breaching the contract.
In contrast, the typical grievance arbitration involves a union challenge to an alleged
employer breach that has already occurred. Occasionally, however, an employer will
announce an action arid, in response to a union's grievance, agree to delay implemen-
tation of the action until the grievance is resolved. Such a stay of implementation does
not deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction or the union of its obligation to exhaust the
grievance procedure.
Union security arbitration is analogous to grievance arbitration where the employer
has agreed to stay implementation of the action being grieved. When a union notifies
potential objectors of its fees, it is announcing the expenditures it plans to make with
those fees. Escrowing postpones implementation of those expenditures pending reso-
lution of the objections. Escrowing does not deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction or the
objectors of their obligation to exhaust the arbitration procedure.
Union security fee arbitration alSo differs from grievance arbitration because it has
its own procedure, separate from the traditional grievance procedure. This separation
is made necessary by the alignment of the parties, rather than by the dispute resolution
function that fee arbitration serves. The union exclusively controls invocation of the
traditional grievance procedure, and the parties to the process are the union and the
employer. Employees often have no standing in their own right, but may only act through
their union. 12g In contrast, the employees invoke the union fee arbitration procedure,
Union, UAW, Dist. Lodge 1093, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1973) (requiring nonmembers to use intra-
union fee objection procedure), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
127 See supra note 2.
128 See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELHOURI, HOU' ARBITRATION WORKS 175-80 (4th ed. 1985).
September 1988] 	 UNION SECURITY FEE ARBITRATION 	 879
and they and the union control it. The employees have individual standing, and the
union opposes them, rather than represents them.
The alignment of the parties in union security fee arbitration does not justify an
exhaustion rule different from that applied to traditional grievance arbitration. Occa-
sionally, a traditional grievance procedure provides for employee challenges to union
conduct. For example, in an exclusive hiring hall setting, an employee may challenge
the union's determination of referral priorities. In such a case, the employee is obligated
to exhaust the grievance procedure before suing the union. 125"
Employees contesting alleged breaches of' collective bargaining agreements must
attempt to use available grievance and arbitration procedures."' The Supreme Court
has articulated exceptions to this general rule, but none should apply to the union
security fee procedure absent special circumstances. An employee may bypass the tra-
ditional contractual grievance and arbitration remedies when the employer effectively
repudiates the contractual procedures, or where the union's wrongful refusal to process
the grievance has prevented the employee from exhausting his or her contractual rem-
edies.L 31 The Court also has exempted situations where an employer-union conspiracy
renders resort to contractual remedies futile.'"
None of the conditions in which employees are permitted to bypass arbitration will
prevail, however, if the union security fee objection procedure complies with the Hudson
standards. If the procedure operates impartially and promptly, there is no reason to
assume that it will he futile or that the union has repudiated it. Moreover, because the
employees invoke the procedure and provide for their own representation in the hearing,
the excuse of a union's wrongful refusal to process a grievance is irrelevant. Thus, if the
fee objection procedure is viewed as a contractual remedy, the collective bargaining
agreement provides the necessary authority for binding objecting employees to an ex-
haustion requirement.
B. Does section 1983 require that employees be permitted to bypass the union security fee
arbitration procedure?
Most union security fee litigation is brought pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. of 1871. Beginning with McNeese a. Board of Education,'" the Supreme Court
consistently has held that a plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative remedies
before bringing a section 1983 suit. In McNeese several black students brought a section
1983 action, alleging that racial segregation of their school system violated their rights
under the fourteenth amendment.' 3' Under state law, the plaintiffs could have com-
plained to the state superintendent of public instruction who, after a hearing, could have
sustained the complaint and referred it to the state attorney general with a request to
12" Kusterns v. Local Union No. 433, hal Ass'n of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental iron
Workers, 175 Cal, Rptr. 874, 876-78 (App. 1981); see also Hannnons v. Adams, 783 F.2d 597 (5th
Cir. 1986) (union has duty of Lin- representation to process grievance challenging referral priorities).
Haymow is criticized in Moreland & Stapp, A Primer on Itiring Hai in the Construction Industry, 37
LAB. L.J. 817, 830 (1986).
' 3" Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
' 31 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185 (1967).
Clover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
149
	 U.S. 668 (1963).
04 1d. at 669-70.
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initiate suit. The lower courts dismissed the section 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust
these state administrative remedies.'" The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning first that
section 1983 provided a federal remedy that supplements the state remedy."s Therefore,
the Court held that invoking the state remedy was not a prerequisite to invoking the
federal remedy.
The Court further reasoned that the section 1983 action sought to vindicate federal
rights.'" The legality of the school district's conduct under state law was, in the Court's
view, irrelevant to the plaintiff's' federal claim. Finally, the Court observed that the state
administrative remedy was deficient.'" The most the administrative procedure could
produce was a request to the state attorney general to litigate the matter in state court.'"
In several subsequent cases, the Court refused to require section 1983 plaintiffs to
exhaust state retnedies. 1° Finally, in Patsy v. Board of Regents, the Court declared that its
cases had established a fiat rule that section 1983 plaintiffs need not exhaust state
administrative remedies.' 4 ' The Court rejected a Fifth Circuit approach that required
exhaustion of state administrative remedies under very limited circumstances. 142 The
Court offered three reasons in support of its decision.
First, the Court examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The
Court found that the Civil Rights Act was a "crucial ingredient in the basic alteration of
our federal system accomplished during the Reconstruction Era," which established the
federal government as the principal guarantor of constitutional rights and gave to the
federal courts a paramount role in protecting those rights."' This realignment of federal
and state authority was necessary because state governments were unwilling or unable
to protect individuals' civil rights.' 44 Thus, the Court concluded, an exhaustion require-
ment was inconsistent with the purpose underlying section 1983. 145
Second, the Court relied on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,'46
which imposed a limited exhaustion requirement for prisoners bringing section 1983
suits.'4 7 The Court observed that Congress assumed that, absent specific legislation, no
135 M. at 670.
,36
 Id. at 671-72.
'" Id. at 674.
1 " Id. at 674-75.
'" Id. at 675.
'40 See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75
(1973); Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 670-71 (1972); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251
(1971); Houghton v. Shafer. 392 U.S. 639, 640-41 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 417
(1967),
' 11 457 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1982).
"2 Id. at 498-516. The Fifth Circuit required exhaustion where five conditions were met: (1)
an orderly system of review was provided; (2) relief commensurate with the claim could be granted;
(3) relief was available within a reasonable period of time; (4) the procedures were fair, not overly
burdensome and would not be used to discourage legitimate claims; and (5) interim relief was
available to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the plaintiff's rights during the administrative
process. 634 F.2d 900, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
"3
 457 U.S. at 503.
'" Id. at 503-04,
Id. at 507,
16 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982).
17 Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508.
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exhaustion of state remedies would be required."" The legislatively imposed exhaustion
scheme was particularly detailed and was expressly limited to prisoner cases. 149
Finally, the Court considered the policy issues underlying a section 1983 exhaustion
requirement and concluded that the resolution of those matters was best left to Congress.
The Court considered such issues as the standards for judging the adequacy of admin-
istrative remedies, tolling and time limit requirements, res judicata and collateral estoppel
effects of administrative findings and the availability of interim judicial relief pending
an administrative bearing. 151) The Court. concluded that legislation could resolve these
issues more efficiently than judicial decision could.
It is facially appealing to suggest that, because a section 1983 claimant need not
exhaust state administrative remedies, a fortiori, a lee objector need not exhaust con-
tractual arbitration remedies. This suggestion might find reinforcement in some of the
traditional reasons for bypassing administrative remedies. Courts often view resort to
such remedies as delaying the plaintiff's access to federal protection of his or her
constitutional rights.' 51 Particularly where a citizen alleges a restraint of his or her
exercise of first amendment rights, the legal system should not deny that person im-
mediate access to a life-tenured federal judge.
Closer scrutiny of the fee objection procedure, however, reveals that the courts
should not allow a fee objector to bypass arbitration. If the union complies with Hudson,
it automatically escrows at least that portion of the objector's fee that is reasonably subject
to dispute. To the extent that monies to which the union is ultimately entitled are
escrowed, and the union is required to divert funds it would have spent on political
activity to replace the escrowed money, the objection prOcedure restrains the first amend-
ment rights of nonobjectors. A reasonably prompt arbitration procedure minimizes this
restraint by confining its duration to that which is necessary to protect the objectors'
rights. Allowing objectors to bypass arbitration will prolong the restraint on nonobjectors'
rights through the delays inherent in the litigation process.
Moreover, objectors who wish to bypass arbitration seek not only to avoid exhaustion,
but also to litigate claims that are not ripe for adjudication. In McNeese, Patsy and similar
cases, government. action had violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The adminis-
trative procedures might have remedied those violations, but only by righting the wrongs
that already had been committed. Similar redress awaited the plaintiffs in federal court.
Fee objectors, however, suffer no constitutional injury when a union collects its
security fee. The injury arises only after the employees, object to the use of the fee on
objectionable expenditures and the fee is so used, even if the use is only temporary. The
automatic escrowing of disputed fees continues until the arbitrator resolves the dispute.
The arbitrator's award determines what portion of the fee the union may properly
spend. Any constitutional injury to the employees occurs only after the arbitrator's award
frees the union to spend objectors' fees on arguably objectionable matters.
Generally, where constitutional injuries will not occur until after administrative
proceedings are completed, section 1983 claims are not ripe for adjudication until those
l98
1A9 Id. at 512.
,50 Id. at 513-14.
151 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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proceedings are exhausted. 152 For example, in Wilson v. Robinson, 153 several deputy sher-
iffs alleged that their employer had discharged them without a hearing, in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment) 54 Some of the deputies also alleged
that their discharges were in retaliation for conduct protected by the first amendment.
The district court enjoined the terminations and ordered the sheriff to provide the
plaintiffs with the pre-termination hearings required under a county ordinance)" The
Eighth Circuit held that, in light of the injunction, litigation of the first amendment
claims should be stayed because they were not ripe for judicial resolution.'" The court
reasoned that, because the thrust of the first amendment claims involved wrongful
discharges, the injunction's removal of the threat of discharge rendered the claims
unripe. The court observed that the employer might abandon the termination attempt,
or the discharges might ultimately not take place. 157 The court distinguished its holding
that the claims were not ripe from a requirement of exhaustion:
The ripeness doctrine addresses some of the concerns of those who are
critical of the no-exhaustion rule in section 1983 cases. It ensures that only
actual deprivations of federal rights can be the basis of section 1983 relief.
Requiring exhaustion, on the other hand, would sweep too far. Even when
a plaintiff has established that his federal rights have been deprived in fact
through state action, he would nonetheless be required to pursue possible
remedies from those responsible for such deprivation before seeking judicial
relief. We decline to impose such a burden.h"
The case for finding pre-arbitration litigation of union security fees to be unripe
under section 1983 is even stronger than the case Wilson v. Robinson presented. A public
employer might use the threat of instituting discharge proceedings against disfavored
employees as part of a larger scheme to suppress first amendment rights. Although a
threatened employee's subjective fears of retaliation do not render a proposed discharge
ripe, intentional misuse of discharge proceedings to chill the exercise of first amendment
rights should permit immediate judicial intervention)."
No such potential chill exists where a fee objection arbitration procedure complies
with the Hudson standards. Unlike the institution of disciplinary proceedings, which
raises negative inferences about the employee, and places the employee on the defensive,
filing a union security fee objection is an affirmative assertion of first amendment rights.
152 See, e.g., Williamston County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
192-94 (1985); Bergh v. Washington, 535 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir,), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 921 (1976);
Broderick v. di Grazia, 504 F.2d 643, 645 (1st Cir. 1974); see also S. NAHMOD, ClVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 283 (2d ed. 1986).
151 668 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1981).
' 54 Id. at 381-82.
'' Id. at 382.
' 56 Id. at 384.
'" Id.
''" Id. (emphasis in original).
15" Compare Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (ambiguous regulation of speech
coupled with threat of discharge chills first amendment rights) with Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 9-
16 (1972) (Army's gathering of data on civilians does not chill first amendment rights where potential
misuse of data is speculative) and National Treasury Employees Union v. Kurtz, 600 F.2d 984, 988-
89 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Internal Revenue Service personnel rule prohibiting disclosure of certain
information does not chill first amendment rights where no specific sanctions against employees
exercising those rights have been threatened).
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No one may draw a general negative inference about the objector from it. Moreover,
the arbitration proceeding does not place the objecting employee on the defensive;
rather, it requires the union to affirmatively justify the charges it seeks to impose on the
objector. Requiring employees to channel their objections through a reasonably prompt
impartial arbitration procedure will not chill their rights not to subsidize political and
ideological causes unrelated to collective bargaining, unless the procedure is abused.
Union abuse of the procedure, however, will cause it to fail to comply with the Hudson
standards and render the fee subject to immediate attack under Hudson.'"
Application of the McNeese-Patsy reasoning that exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is not required confirms that preventing objectors from bypassing the arbitra-
tion procedure is proper. Because the constitutional injury can only arise after the arbitral
award, the paramount role of the federal courts in protecting constitutional rights cannot
come into play until the arbitrator has rendered an award. Moreover, resolution of the
constitutional issues raised by the section 1983 suit depends on the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding. The arbitration and the section 1983 litigation arc not parallel
remedies. Instead, the arbitration authorizes the union to spend the fee objector's funds;
the section 1983 suit seeks to remedy that authorization. Finally, the scope of the arbitral
exhaustion requirement does not raise the complicated legislative policy judgments that
the Patsy Court considered best left to Congress. Rather, it raises first amendment due
process issues, issues that are particularly suited for judicial resolution. These first
amendment issues include the impartiality and reasonable promptness of the proceedings
and the scope of judicial review of the arbitrator's award.
C. Do prior Court decisions on the fee objection process permit the objector to bypass arbitration?
In addition to potential conflicts with Supreme Court interpretations of section
1983, preventing objectors from bypassing arbitration may conflict with Supreme Court
interpretations of the fee objection process. In Brotherhood of Railway & SteaMship Clerks
v. Allen,'" a case decided under the Railway Labor Act, employees opposed to the use
of their union security fees did not communicate their objections to the union,'" but
instead filed suit in state court challenging the constitutionality of the union shop agree-
ment.'" Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hanson, the employees amended
their complaint to allege that. the union was spending their fees on political causes to
which they were opposed.'" The Supreme Court noted that employees first alerted the
union to their objections by filing their complaint in state court, but stated that such
notice of objection was sufficient.' 65
Similarly, in Abood, the Court found that there was sufficient notice of objection to
the union by the allegation in the employees' complaint that they were opposed to any
expenditures of their funds for political or ideological causes unrelated to collective
Dissenting employees can avoid exhausting arbitration remedies by alleging that the pro-
cedure is constitutionally deficient. if, on its face, the procedure complies with Hudson, the court
should require the dissenters to conic forward with something more than conclusory allegations to
avoid summary disposition of their claim.
"" 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
1 (12 Id. at 119 n.6.
Id. at 116.
1 ' Allen, 249 N.C, 491, 493-94, 107 S.E.2d 125, 126 (1959).
I" 373 U.S. at 119 n.6.
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bargaining. 166
 Read broadly, Allen and Abood might suggest that notice of objection may
be communicated to the union by any reasonable means, including the filing of a lawsuit.
Such a broad reading, however, is inappropriate. The tinions in Allen and Abood did not
have internal objection procedures at the time the lawsuits were filed. 167 In both cases,
the Court viewed the establishment of internal procedures as highly desirable 168 and in
Abood the Court suggested that exhaustion of such a procedure might be required. 169
Abood and Allen should be read to permit objectors to use any reasonable means to
communicate their objections only in situations where the unions lack appropriate ob-
jection procedures.
Generally, where resort to an internal union remedy is required prior to initiating
litigation, the burden is on the union to provide a clearly defined procedure. For
example, under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 17°
union members claiming that an officer election violated Title IV must pursue internal
union remedies for up to three months before filing complaints with the Secretary of
Labor."' A union may require members alleging union violations of Title I's member
bill of rights to pursue internal remedies for up to four months before filing suit.' 72
Under the LMRDA, however, the burden is on the union to develop clear and effective
internal procedures.'"
Similarly, exhaustion of internal union remedies may he appropriate in certain
circumstances before members sue their unions for breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation.'" Here too, if' internal procedures are not clearly delineated by the union, the
employee is not expected to know of them or exhaust them.'" Thus, when viewed in
the context of general judicial treatment of internal union remedies, Allen and Abood
present cases where the union's failure to clearly delineate an objection procedure freed
the employees of any requirement to notify the union before filing suit. The two decisions
do not authorize an objector to bypass constitutionally adequate and clearly delineated
internal objection procedures.
D. Does mandatory' resort to arbitration unconstitutionally burden objectors' first amendment
rights?
Courts have closely scrutinized requirements that individuals use specific procedures
before they may exercise first amendment rights, and have frequently struck down such
requirements. For example, in Lamont v. Postmaster General"" the Court held unconsti-
' 66
 Abood v. Detroit Bd. or Educ., 431 U.S. 208, 241 (1977).
' 67
 See Ahead, 431 U.S. at 240; Allen, 373 U.S. at 122-23.
1 " Abood, 431 U.S. at 240; Allen, 373 U.S. at 122-23.
167
	 431 U.S. at 242.
17 " 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1982).
" 1 Id.
192 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1982).
' 73 See Donovan v. Sailors' Union of the Pac., 739 F.2d 1426, 1428 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Vandeventer v.' Local Union No. 513 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
579 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Steib v. New Orleans Clerks and
Checkers, Local No. 1497, 436 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir. 1971); Marshall v. Local 1859, Intl Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, 105 L.R.R.M. 3380; 3381 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
171 See Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 695 (1981).
173 See flammons v. Adams, 783 F.2d 597, 602 (5th Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Marsh Plating
Corp., 443 F. Supp. 811, 813-15 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
176 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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tutional a statute that required the postmaster to detain mail from foreign countries if
it contained "communist political propaganda," and that also required the postmastei to
advise the addressee that such matter would be delivered only upon the addressee's
request. 177 The Court reasoned that the almost certain effect of placing an affirmative
obligation on addressees to request their mail was to deter addressees from receiving
their mail. "8
In many other cases, the Court has indicated approval of license and permit re-
quirements if the requirements are content-neutral and place only reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions on first amendment activities.' 78 To be valid, the license or
permit procedure must contain strict procedural safeguards against abuse, including
clearly delineated, objective and narrowly drawn criteria,'" and immediate judicial re-
view of a license denial." The Hudson Court," however, distinguished these cases and
held that the Constitution does not require immediate judicial review of union security
fees.' 82
The Hudson Court's distinction is sound. In its prior cases, the Court considered
government action that placed obstacles in the path of individuals' exercise of their first
amendment rights. Absent the statute in Lamont, the addressee would receive all of his
or her mail regardless of content or point of origin. Absent a licensing or permit
requirement, a demonstrator could parade and a movie theater could exhibit without
obtaining government approval. When government requirements thus burden the ex-
ercise of first amendment rights, the government must minimize the burden and max-
imize the procedural safeguards.
Employees covered by union security agreements occupy a different position. Their
objections to expenditure of their fees on nonchargeable items are not procedural
obstacles they must overcome to exercise their first amendment rights. The act of
objecting is the exercise of a first amendment right. It is the objection that registers the
fee payer's dissent to expenditures that the union could otherwise constitutionally charge.
Channeling fee objections into the arbitration prOCedure will not deter employees
from objecting. The sole source of deterrent cried results from the union's knowledge
of the objectors' identities. The union will gain this knowledge regardless of whether
the objection is made through the arbitration procedure or by filing a lawsuit.
Once the objection is made, all burdens shift to the union. The union, through
advance reductions and escrows, must insure that it will not spend the objectors' fee on
nonchargeable expenditures pending resolution of the objection. Moreover, if the union
wishes ultimately to gain the use of the objectors' fees, it must justify the charges thai
form the bases for the fees. Channeling objections through a valid Hudson objection
procedure including arbitration thus does not overly burden the employees' rights to be
free from subsidizing objectionable expenditures. Accordingly, objectors should not be
allowed to bypass an arbitration procedure that complies with the Hudson standards.
When the union follows the procedure, an objector's post-arbitration lawsuit essentially
seeks judicial review of the arbitration award.
171 Id. at 302, 305.
"8 Id. at 307.
179 See, e.g., lief fron v. International Soc'y fur Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
m° See Freedman v, Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965).
Sec Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
1 '12 Chicago Teachers Union, Local No, 1 v. Hudson, 975 U.S. 298, 308 11.20 (1986).
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V. REVIEW OF THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD
In Hudson, the Court noted, "Whe arbitrator's decision would not receive preclusive
effect in any subsequent § 1983 action."'" The only support the Court offered for this
unfortunate dictum was a citation to McDonald v. City of West Branch,'" the third of a
trilogy of Supreme Court decisions that held that arbitration awards under collective
bargaining agreements do not preclude subsequent litigation of related federal statutory
claims. In the first such case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,'" the plaintiff alleged that
his discharge from employment was racially motivated, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 " The plaintiff had previously grieved his discharge under the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator had denied the grievance and
found that there was just cause for the discharge.'" The Court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to a de novo trial on his Title VII complaint in United States district court.'"
The Court first reasoned that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than
supplant, existing remedies.'" The Court observed that the statutory cause of action was
independent of the contractual grievance.'" Congress, the Court concluded, did not
intend to preclude de novo consideration of a Title VII claim where an arbitrator has
denied a contractual grievance arising out of the same transaction." The Court also
relied on the distinctly separate nature of the contractual and statutory rights to reject
the employer's claims that the employee had waived his Title VII rights prospectivelym
and that allowing the Title VII action to proceed gave the employee "two strings to his
bow when the employer has only one.""
The Court next considered whether it should adopt a policy of deferral to arbitration
awards. It rejected the concept, offering three reasons. First, the Court viewed the
arbitrator as an expert in contractual interpretation rather than an expert in the law
under Title VII.'" Second, the Court viewed the relative informality of the arbitration
process compared to the judicial process as rendering arbitration a less appropriate
forum for resolving Title VII issueS. 1 " Finally, the Court expressed concern that the
union controlled the presentation of the grievance and that the collective interests
represented by the union might conflict with the individual interests of the grievant.' 96
In Barrentine v. Arkansas
-
Best Freight System, Inc.,'" the second case in the trilogy, the
Court applied Gardner-Denver to an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),I 98
The plaintiffs were truck drivers whom federal regulation required to conduct pre-trip
' 8' Id.
'" 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (cited by Hudson, 475 U.S. at 308 n.20).
1 " 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
'B" 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1982). See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43.
'" 415 U.S. at 39-43.
188 Id. at 59-60.
'Bs Id. at 48-49.
' 90 Id. at 49-50.
I'" Id.
' 92 Id. at 51-54.
' 93 Id, at 54.
194 Id. at 57.
195 Id. at 57-58.
' 96 Id. at 58 n.I9,
197
 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
196 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 216(b) (1978 & Stipp. 1987).
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safety inspections of their trucks, but whom their employers did not compensate for
time spent in the inspection or in obtaining repairs of defects that the inspection uncov-
ered.''J9 The plaintiff's filed grievances, which a joint union-employer grievance commit-
tee rejected. 200 The Court held that. the grievance committee's award did not preclude
the plaintiffs front receiving de nova consideration of their FLSA claims. 20 '
The defendant had argued that, unlike the Gardner-Denver Title VII claim, the
FLSA claims involved wages, a matter at the heart of the collective bargaining process. 202
The Court rejected this distinction. It reasoned that FLSA and Title VII both conferred
rights on individual employees that were independent of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. 203 The Court reiterated the concerns over arbitrator expertise, procedural infor-
mality and exclusive union control of the grievance presentation that it had expressed
in Gardner-Denver.2 U4 It then added another concern: that the remedies available to an
arbitrator under the contract likely would be more limited than those available to a court
under the statute. 208
In City of West Branch, the last case in the trilogy, the plaintiff sued pursuant to
section 1983, claiming that his employment was terminated in retaliation against his
exercise of first amendment rights. 210" An arbitrator had sustained the plaintiff's dis-
charge, finding that it was supported by just cause. 217 The Court appeared to derive
from Gardner -Denver and Barreutine a general rule that awards rendered in collectively
bargained arbitration procedures do not preclude subsequent litigation of federal sta-
tutory claims arising out of the same action that gave rise to the grievarice. 208 Lower
courts generally have applied these cases to deny preclusive effects to arbitration awards
in litigation under other employment statutes.n"
The relationship between union security fee arbitration and subsequent section 1983
litigation is significantly different from the relationship between grievance arbitration
and subsequent statutory litigation. Grievance arbitration and statutory litigation provide
parallel avenues for seeking to remedy an injury that already has occurred. In grievance
arbitration, the only issue before the arbitrator is whether the employer violated the
collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement is the basis of the
arbitrator's award. The relevance of statutes or case law depends entirely on the collective
bargaining agreement. Consequently, the arbitration may ignore totally the statutory
uni 450 U.S. at 730.
2 'm Id. at 730-31. Such joint employer-union grievance committees serve the sante function as
independent arbitrators, and courts treat their awards in the same manner. General Drivers, Local
Union No. 89 v. Kiss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963).
201 450 U.S. at 745.
202 Id. at 738.
213 Id. at 738-45.
204 Id. at 742-44.
203 Id. at 744-45.
206 466 U.S. at 286.
"7 Id.
2 "8 Id. at 292.
2"See, e.g., Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 916-18 (8th Cir. 1986) (claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1982)); Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir.
1986) (claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982)).
But see Gonzalez v, Southern Par. Transport. Co., 773 F.20 637 (5th Cir. 1985) (deferring to
arbitrator's findings in claim under anti-retaliation provisions of Federal Employers' Liability Act,
45 U.S.C. § 60 (1982)).
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claim.") Even where the arbitrator considers elements of the statutory claim, because
the statute itself is not the basis of the grievance, the arbitrator's ruling cannot resolve
the statutory cause of action.
In contrast, union security fee arbitration presents the arbitrator with the identical
constitutional challenge to the amount of the fee that a court faces in the subsequent
section 1983 lawsuit. This identity of issues before the arbitrator and the court occurs
because the contractual authorization of a union security fee must be read to permit a
fee that is no broader than the Constitution authorizes. 2 " Thus, in the arbitration, the
union must prove that its fee is based only on expenditures that constitutionally may be
charged over objection. In section 1983 litigation, the union must prove the same thing.
If the union maintains a proper escrow, per the Hudson decision, no constitutional
injury occurs until after the arbitrator has issued the award. The security fee infringes
objectors' first amendment rights only if the arbitrator authorizes charges based on
nonchargeable expenditures.'lhe escrow insures that the section 1983 lawsuit, in essence,
will be an action to review the arbitrator's award. Thus, the arbitrator not only is
empowered to consider the constitutional issues but is also required to do so. The award
must be based on the Constitution 212
In light of the identity of issues facing the arbitrator and the court, the Hudson
dicta's analogy of a section 1983 union security fee lawsuit to City of West Branch is simply
inappropriate. Indeed, when statutory claims are submitted to arbitration, in subsequent
litigation courts generally defer to the arbitrator's award, unless the award displays a
manifest disregard for the law.213 Analysis of the nature of union security fee arbitration
reveals that the City of West Branch, Barrentine and Gardner-Denver concerns with employ-
ees' control of their representation, arbitrator expertise and remedial authority, and
procedural informality are not present in union security fee arbitration.
First, in union security fee arbitration, the objecting employees exclusively control
their own representation. They do not depend on their unions or their employers to
invoke the procedure or present their cases. In grievance arbitration, by contrast, the
only legal control that the grievant can exercise over the union's case presentation is the
21 " The lower courts have differed over what weight to give an arbitration award that did not
consider the statutory claim. In Becton v. Detroit Terminal of Consol. Freightways, 687 F.2d 140,
142 (6th Cir. 1982), cent, denied, 460 VS. 1040 (1983), the Sixth Circuit held in a Title VII action
that an award finding just cause for discharge fulfills the defendant's burden of articulating a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge under McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973). In Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279,284 (7th Cir. 1986), however,
the Seventh Circuit upheld the exclusion from evidence of an arbitration award, finding that the
Plaintiff had been discharged for just cause because the arbitrator had not considered the first
amendment issues that the section 1983 action raised.
211
 See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. See also Springfield Educ. Ass'n and Spring-
field Bd. of Educ., Fair Share Arbitration, slip op. (Feb. 18, 1988) (Malin, Arb.),
212
 The arbitrator's award may also be based on a state labor relations statute. Some statutes
authorize union security fees that are narrower than the Constitution permits. For example, dif-
ferent language in the fair share provisions of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch . 48, If 1601-27 (1987) and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch . 48 ¶11 1701-21 (1987) suggests that the IPLRA's union security fee is narrower than what the
Constitution alone would allow. Malin, Fair Share Fees Under the Illinois Labor Relations Acts, 3 ILL.
PUB. EMI'L. REL. REP. I (Winter 1986).
2 ' 3 See, e.g., In re Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211,1213-14 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,436-37 (1953)); Maidman v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25,27-28 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37).
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union's duty of fair representation. Under this duty, however, the union has broad
discretion in issues of strategy. 2L4 The Court's concern with the union's control of the
grievance procedure is consistent with general principles of litigation preclusion. The
doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar parties from litigating issues that they did
not have fair opportunities to litigate previously. 215 Where a party has had a fair oppor-
tunity to litigate an issue in arbitration, however, the arbitrator's award may be used in
future litigation to collaterally estop that party from relitigating factual findings that
were necessary for the award. 2 'i
Although union control over the grievance procedure normally may deprive the
grievant of a sufficiently fair opportunity to litigate, so that an arbitration award is not
entitled to collateral estoppel effect, the grievant's active involvement in the grievance
proceeding will increase the significance of the grievance outcome in subsequent statutory
litigation. For example, in Strozier v. General Motors Corp. 4 17 the plaintiff had filed griev-
ances under the collective bargaining agreement contesting, inter alia, his disciplinary
suspension and his discharge on two occasions."' He also had tiled a lawsuit alleging
that the suspension and discharges were racially motivated, in violation of Title VII and
section 1981. Thereafter, the plaintiff, represented by counsel, and the defendant vol-
untarily settled two of the grievances. 219 Although the settlement did not expressly release
the statutory claims, the Fifth Circuit held that it foreclosed the lawsuit. 22° The court
apparently found the plaintiff's participation in the grievance settlement to be significant,
because it rested its holding on two factors: the plaintiff had voluntarily accepted the
settlement and the grievance had sought the same remedies as were sought in the
lawsuit. 221 'Thus, objecting employees' control over their own representation in union
security fee litigation greatly diminishes the need for de novo consideration of the fee
amount in subsequent section 1983 litigation.
Concern over arbitrator expertise has also led the Court to deny preclusive effect
to grievance arbitration awards in statutory litigation. Grievance arbitrators are presumed
to be expert in contract interpretation, but not in statutory interpretation. This concern
led the Seventh Circuit in Hudson to conclude that arbitration was an inherently unsuit-
able forum for resolving union security fee . objections. The Supreme Court, however,
rejected such a broad indictment of arbitrators' qualifications.
214 See generally M. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 384-89 (1988).
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
216 Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1985); Maid-
man v. O'Brien, 473 F. Supp. 25, 29-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Goldstein v, Doft, 236 F. Supp. 730
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966).
217 635 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1981).
218 Id. at 425.
219 Id. at 426.
220 Id
221 Id. There are strong reasons to confine Strozier to grievance settlements prior to arbitration
in which the grievant is actively involved. Even if the union and employer allow a grievant to
provide his or her own representation in the arbitration, courts may refuse to give the award
preclusive effect in subsequent statutory litigation. The grievant who chooses to bypass the union's
representation in the arbitration may antagonize the union whose help is needed in assembling
evidence and witnesses. Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Em-
ployment Discrimination, 39 U. CHI, L. REV. 30, 45 (1971). The presence of the individual's represen-
tative, rather than the union's, in the arbitration may signal the arbitrator that the union and
employer jointly oppose the grievance. Id. at 45-46. These concerns arc not present in union
security fee arbitration where it is understood that the union and the objectors are adversaries.
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Beginning with the Steelworker Trilogy, 222 the Supreme Court has developed a national
labor policy that strongly supports arbitration of collective bargaining grievances, prem-
ised on its view of arbitrators' expertise in the common law of the shop.225 Arbitrators
are unique because of their institutional expertise. The courts presume arbitrators to be
institutionally qualified to resolve contractual grievances because the parties have selected
them for that purpose.2" Their acceptability to the parties depends on their ability to
interpret the parties' contracts ill ways that are consistent with the parties' intent and
priorities. Arbitrators' institutional expertise derives from the parties' consent to be
bound by their contractual interpretation. 225
Thus, in grievance arbitration, the arbitrators' institutional expertise is limited to
the common law of the shop. The parties have selected an arbitrator whose judgment
on the contract they have consented to accept. 226 There is, however, no support for a
general presumption that the parties, by selecting an arbitrator to interpret their contract,
also have consented to accept his or her judgment on statutes potentially applicable to
the same controversy. Indeed, because the arbitrator's responsibility in grievance arbi-
tration is to further the private purpose of the contract, rather than the public purpose
of the statute, there is reason to presume that the parties' selection accepts only the
arbitrator's contractual judgments. 227
Nevertheless, many individual arbitrators have the training and expertise to inter-
pret and apply statutes as well as the contract. Moreover, where the contract contains
language that parallels the statute, there is reason to believe that expertise in the statute
played at least a secondary role in the arbitrator's selection. Thus, in Gardner-Denver the
Court stated that an arbitration award may be admitted as evidence in subsequent Title
VII litigation with its weight a function of, inter alia, the presence of a no discrimination
Clause in the collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrator's personal expertise. 2"
In union security fee arbitration, the arbitrator is selected not for the private purpose
of interpreting the parties' collective bargaining agreement, but for the express public
purpose of adjudicating the constitutional rights of the objecting employees. The arbi-
trator will be selected for expertise in adjudicating union security fees, rather than for
expertise in the common law of the shop. For example, the American Arbitration
Association's Rules provide for AAA appointment of an arbitrator from a separate panel
of union fee arbitrators whose qualifications the AAA has screened. 222 One can expect
most union security fee arbitrators will be appointed by AAA or state labor relations
222
 United Steelworkers of Am. v. America Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1900); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
223 See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
22.1 United Paperworkers Intl Union v. ;disco, 108 S. Ct. 364, 370 (1987).
225 See Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.f . 916 (1979).
2.2r, See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
227 See Meltzer. supra note 221, at 33.
225 Alexander V. Gardner-Denver Ci),, 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974). Empirical evidence supports
the supposition that parties processing a discrimination grievance seek arbiti-ators with expertise in
discrimination law. See Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, 20
NATIONAL. ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS PROC., 59 (1976) (tell percent of arbitrators receive ninety
percent of discrimination cases). The evidence also indicates that the arbitrators are deciding these
grievances in accordance with Title VII. See Stallworth & Hoyman, The Arbitration of Discrimination
Grievances in the Aftermath tf Gardner-Denver, 39 ARR. J. Sept. 1984, at 49, 55.
229 AAA Roi.Es, supra note 44, Rule 3.
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boards after screening their qualifications. independent agency screening and appoint-
ment of union security fee arbitrators will further insulate the arbitrators from the
private contractual interests of employers and unions and will develop the arbitrators'
institutional expertise in adjudicating union security fees. 2" Thus, concern over arbitra-
tor expertise should not justify de TIOVO consideration of the fee amount in subsequent
section 1983 litigation.
A third concern the Court has voiced in denying preclusive effect to arbitration
awards in statutory litigation is that a court's statutory remedial authority is broader than
an arbitrator's contractual remedial authority.23 l Concern over arbitral remedial authority
is irrelevant to the issue of how to treat a union security fee award in subsequent section
1983 litigation. The arbitrator does not face an injured employee seeking a remedy. The
employee's objection triggers an escrow at least equal to the amount of the fee subject
to reasonable dispute and puts the union to its proof, before the arbitrator, of its
entitlement to the fee. The arbitrator's role is not to assess injury and remedy, but to
determine the amount of fee, if' any, to which the union is entitled. The employee's
injury arises only after the arbitrator's award, and then only to the extent that the award
is in error.
The most troubling concern the Court raised in Gardner-Denver and its progeny is
the informality of the arbitral process. Arbitration, however, need not be as informal as
the Gardner-Denver Court portrayed it. Although witnesses need not be sworn:arbitrators
have the authority to administer oaths. 2" Arbitrators also have authority to issue sub-
poenas. 252 There is no requirement that a verbatim record of the proceedings be main-
tained or transcribed, but parties often use court reporters and transcripts in arbitra-
tion.2" Although the courts do not require arbitrators to explain the reasons for their
2
" 1) The courts have expressly approved the AAA Rules. See Damian() v. Matish, 830 F.2d 1363,
1371-72 (6th Cir. 1987); Andrews v. Education Ass'n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987).
One may argue that the use of labor arbitrators to resolve union security fee disputes may inject a
subtle institutional bias against fee payers. The caseload of the typical labor arbitrator is dominated
by grievance and interest arbitrations in which the union and the employer jointly select the
arbitrator. The typical union security fee arbitration will involve the fee payers and the union, The
fee payers are not likely to control much, if any, RID/ re work for the arbitrator. The union, however,
is far more likely to be in a position to select the arbitrator for future cases. Under these circum-
stances, subliminal concern for future selections arguably may bias the arbitrator subtly in favor of
the union, When the parties to an arbitration are the union and the employer, the employer and
its representatives arc in a position similar to the union regarding future selection of the arbitrator,
thus eliminating or greatly diminishing the potential for subtle bias. Cf. Getman, supra note 47, at
936 (making a similar point regarding the potential for subtle pro-employer arbitral bias in nonu-
nion wrongful discharge arbitration).
The argument overstates the potential for subtle bias. Although the union and the fee payers
frequently will be the only parties appearing before the arbitrator, a union security fee arbitration
still occurs in the context of the union-employer collective bargaining relationship. The employer
often will be aware oldie arbitrator's conduct of the proceeding and decision in the case. Arbitrators
overtly or subconsciously concerned with future selection might discount the lee payers' perception
of their handling of the proceeding, but they cannot discount the employer's perception of the
arbitrator's impartiality.
23 ' Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. 450 U.S. 728, 744-45 (1981).
4" Uniform Arbitration Act § 7(a) (1955), reported, as amended in 1956, in 27 LAB. Alas.
(BNA) 909, 910 (1957).
2:is
234 See Jordan, Comment, Can the Labor Arbitration Process Be Simplified? If So, in What Manner and
at What Expense?, 39 NATIONAL ACADEMY' or ARBITRATORS PROC., 92, 97 (1987) (21 percent of
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awards,M the parties in labor cases usually expect written opinions and the arbitrators
usually oblige them.256
 Employing sworn witnesses, subpoenas, transcripts and written
opinions dissipates much of the Court's concern with informality.
One feature of arbitration that remains informal is the absence of formal discovery.
The burden of proof that the union bears, however, compensates for the lack of formal
discovery. The union has the burden of proving how the fees will be spent because the
union .
 has access to the relevant evidence. 297 Unions have argued that they can meet this
burden by showing the percentage of union dues allocated to objectionable expenditures.
The Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission (MLRC) has rejected this argument,
holding that a union must affirmath;ely prove the expenditures that underlie the fee
being charged, rather than only the expenditures that the union is willing to admit it
cannot. charge.m The MLRC position is sound. Just as the union must give potential
objectors notice of the expenditures that form the basis of the fee, so that they can make
an informed•decision on whether to object, so too must the union submit proof that
affirmatively justifies the fee it seeks to charge to enable the arbitrator to assess the fee's
appropriateness.
This burden on the union is crucial. If the union could satisfy its burden of proof
by merely showing the percentage of dues admittedly apportioned to objectionable
expenditures, the burden would then effectively fall on the objectors to affirmatively
attack the fee claimed by the union. The objectors could not attack the fee without
knowing the components of the fee ;
 which they could not learn without prehearing
discovery. The union's burden to prove the expenditures on which it has based the fee
forces the union to introduce in its case-in-chief all evidence on which it intends to rely.
The objectors are then in a position to attack the union's justification and may obtain
any additional relevant evidence through subpoenas. Although prehearing discovery of
this evidence would facilitate objectors' preparation for the hearing, the arbitrator can
compensate for the absence of discovery by granting a reasonable continuance upon
request at the close of the union's case-in-chief. A desire to avoid continuances may
arbitrations in 1984 had transcripts); 1987 Labor Statistics Mirror 1986, STUDY TIME, No. 1, 1988 at
5.
"s United Steelworkers v, Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
236
 Professor Getman explains that:
The advantages of utilizing precedent make it desirable that arbitrators write opinions.
Written opinions also serve to explain to the losing side why it lost and may convince
a rejected grievant that he has at least had his day in court." A written opinion helps
to ensure that the arbitrator will consider the opposing contentions and formulate a
coherent resolution. It also affords an arbitrator a way to demonstrate his intelligence,
fairness, and good judgment, all of which may help him to be chosen in the future.
Getman, supra note '225, at 920-21 (citations omitted). The AAA Rules require a written opinion
justifying the award. AAA RULES, supra note 44, Rule 24.
237 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
2"
 Newton Teachers.Ass'n and Roman, No. MUPL-2685, 13 MAss. LAB. REL. REP. (New Este..
LEG. Putt.) 1152 (Mass. Lab. Rd. Comm'n Apr. 3, 1987); Pultz and Milford Teachers Ass'n, No.
MUPL-249, 13 MASS. LAB. REL. REP. (NEw ENG. Lec: PuB.) 1149 (Mass. Lab. Rd. Comm'n. Apr.
3, 1987); Dailey and Woburn Teachers Ass'n, No. MUPL-2850, 13 MASS. LAB. REL. REP. (NEW ENG.
LEG. PUB) 1147 (Mass. Lab. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 3, 1987); Herbst and Educ. Ass'n of Worcester, No.
MUPL-2639, 13 MAss. LAB. REL, REP. (NEW ENG. LEG. PUB.) 1151 (Mass. Lab, Rel. Comm'n Apr.
3, 1987); accord Andrews v. Educ. Ass'n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 341 (2d Cir. 1987); Tierney v.
City of Toledo, 824_ F.2d 1497, 1503 (6th Cir. 1987); DuQuoin Education Ass'n and Bosecker, 4
P.E*.1.1i 1064 (Ill. Educ. Lab. Rd. Bd. 1988).
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prompt the union voluntarily to grant objectors prehearing inspection of its evidence. 232
Thus, the absence of discovery in arbitration does not mandate de novo consideration of
the fee amount in subsequent section 1983 litigation.
The above analysis makes clear that City of West Branch does not support the Hudson
Court's dictum that union security fee arbitration awards should not be given preclusive
effect in subsequent section 1983 litigation. The dictum also ignores the Court's inter-
pretation of City of West Branch in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd. 24° In Byrd the plaintiff
sued his stockbroker for alleged. violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
various claims under state law. 14L The plaintiff's contract with the defendant provided
for submission of their disputes to arbitration. 242 The defendant moved to compel
arbitration of the state law claims and stay proceedings on the federal securities claims.
The Ninth Circuit below denied this, reasoning that because the state law claims were
intertwined with the securities claims, an arbitration award on the state claims might
collaterally estop the plaintiff and thus deny him a federal trial on the securities claims. 243
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis and held that the parties
must arbitrate the state law clanns. 2" The Court interpreted City of We Branch as
requiring a case-by-case analysis to determine whether giving an arbitration award col-
lateral estoppel effect in subsequent statutory litigation adequately protects the federal
interests underlying the statute." , As discussed above, the reasons that led, the Court in
City of West Branch to conclude that grievance arbitration does not adequately protect the
federal interests underlying section 1983 do not apply to union security fee arbitration.
judicial review of union security fee arbitration awards is more closely analogous to
judicial review of grievance arbitration awards than to judicial reconsideration of arbi-
tration awards in subsequent parallel statutory claims. judicial review of grievance awards
arises when one party sues the other to enforce or enjoin the award. The basis of the
suit is breach of contract, brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Aci,"6 in the private sector and comparable statutes in the public sector."'
Union security fee cases and grievance cases present the courts with the identical
claims presented to the arbitrators. In both types of cases, the arbitrator is selected for
his or her expertise with respect to the claims presented, and the moving party, the
union in the grievance and the objecting employee in the union fee case, controls its
own representation in the arbitration. Courts broadly defer to arbitration awards in
grievance cases, enforcing the awards unless they can state positively that the dispute
was not arbitrable 248 or the award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.249
239
 For example, in the AFSCME Illinois arbitration, the union voluntarily Made its documetp.
union available for inspection by objectors several weeks before the hearing. AFSCME-Illinois
Award, supra note 98, at 25.
249 470 U.S. 218 (1985).
241 Id at 214.
242 Id, at 215.
24, Id, at 216-17.
244 Id. at 217,
243 Id. at 222-23.
246 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982),
247 See, e.g., 5 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 202(1) (1987); 48 ILL REv, STAT. § 1611(e) (1987).
24H See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
242 United States Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,597 (1960).
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The analogy to grievance arbitration breaks down in one crucial respect. When the
parties agree to submit grievances to arbitration, they agree to be bound by the arbitra-
tor's interpretation of their contract. As long as the award is based on contract, and not
on the arbitrator's personal notions of industrial justice 2 51 the parties receive exactly
what they bargained for and a court must enforce that bargain. 25 ' If the parties wish to
change the arbitrator's interpretation, they may do so by mutual agreement.
Union security fee arbitration, however, involves constitutional, rather than con-
tractual rights. Although one can say that the contract means whatever the arbitrator
says it means, one cannot say the same for the Constitution. The ultimate authority for
interpreting the Constitution rests with the courts. 252 This distinction mandates that
courts review union security arbitration rulings on issues of law de novo in subsequent
section 1983 litigation.
Union security arbitrators' rulings on issues of fact do not require the same scope
of review. There is no reason to subject findings on basic facts to de novo consideration.
These include findings on witnesses' credibility, document authenticity, the appropriate-
ness of accounting procedures, the factual basis of projected expenditures and arithmetic
computations. In first amendment litigation, however, the limits of what fails outside the
Constitution's protection often turn on judicial evaluation of special facts that have
constitutional significance. A reviewing court must make an independent review of these
factual Findings, based on the record as a whole, to ensure that the trier of fact's findings
will not inhibit protected expression. 255
25" Id.; see also Torrington Co. v. Metal Prod. Workers Union Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680
(2d Cir. 1966).
221
 The Court has stated this view on many occasions, most recently in United Paperworkers
Intl Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364, 370-71 (1987):
Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen
by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the
meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear
claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing
decisions of lower courts. To resolve disputes about the application of a collective-
bargaining agreement, an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those
findings simply because it disagrees with them. The same is true of the arbitrator's
interpretation of the contract. The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of
the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the
language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that
the arbitrator misread the contract .... As the Court has said, the arbitrator's award
settling a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement
must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator's own
notions of industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing
or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.
952
	 in other contexts, the Court has emphasized the need for speedy judicial review
of decisions that infringe first amendment rights. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). These decisions
are based on the recognition that the institutional characteristics of the courts, including the
appointment process and life tenure, insulate judges from external pressures and make the judiciary
that body of government that. is most capable of protecting first amendment rights. See Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 522-24 (1970).
255
	 e.g., Bose Corp. N'. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-86 (1964)); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,
108-09 (1973); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 585-88 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
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In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.,'254 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
judicial duty to review constitutional facts independently. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant disparaged it with false statements in a review of the plaintiff's stereo speak-
ers. 2 "i 5 The plaintiff' conceded that it was a public figure and that, under New York Times
v. Sullivan, 256 it had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
statements were made with actual malice. 257 The Court recognized that the presence of
malice raised factual issues, but held that those factual findings were of such constitu-
tional significance that they warranted independent review on appeal.'"
One can use the award in the AFSCME Illinois fair share arbitration to illustrate
how a court may apply Bose Corp. to section 1983 union security fee litigation. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the nature of public sector collective bargaining may
justify charging objectors for certain political expenditures that are not chargeable under
the Railway Labor Act, but has offered no guidance on how to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible charges. 259 The arbitrator found that almost all of
AFSCME's lobbying activity was chargeable. 260 This included lobbying concerning the
federal budget, tax reform and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The arbitrator based these
findings on testimony from union witnesses. He believed that the testimony established
that these expenditures were integrally related to the union's collective bargaining activ-
ities.
Implicit in the arbitrator's ruling Was a legal conclusion that these lobbying expen-
ditures could be charged to objectors if the union provided a sufficient factual founda-
tion. Under the standard proposed herein, this legal conclusion would be subject to de
novo review. Assuming that it is correct, the arbitrator's finding of a sufficient basis for
charging these expenditures would involve a factual issue of constitutional significance.
Just as the finding of actual malice in Bose Corp. took the speech outside the first
amendment's protection, the finding of an integral relationship between the lobbying
and collective bargaining takes the objection outside the first amendment's protection.
The Supreme Court's standard permits unions to charge for expenditures reasonably
or necessarily incurred as representative. This standard is so general that it takes on
significance only when applied to specific facts. The Supreme Court has recognized this
by its failure to define the dividing line between chargeable and objectionable expendi-
tures with greater precision and by its apparent decision to draw the line on a case-by-
case, expenditure-by-expenditure basis. 21'' Thus, under the standard of review proposed
herein, the factual findings concerning the relationship between lobbying expenditures
and collective bargaining would be subject to independent judicial review."'
254
	 U.S. 485,499 (1984) (quoting New York Times 376 U,S. at 284).
2" Id. at 993.
256 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
237
	
Corp., 466 U.S. at 492.
2" Id. at 51•1.
259 See Abood v. Detroit. Bd. of Ethic., 431 U.S. 209,235-36 (1977).
AFSCME-Illinois Award, supra note 98, slip op. at 39-40.
21" The Court appears to have adopted this expenditure-by-expenditure approach in Ellis v.
Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,448-57 (1984).
262 The need for independent judicial review does not justify a trial de novo. As Professor
Monaghan has observed:
In applying Freedman [v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965),1 to administrative determina-
tions, however, one must recognize an important distinction. Freedman requires only
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On the other hand, such factual findings as how much money the union spent on
particular lobbying efforts and what percentage of dues was attributable to particular
expenditures do not require the application of imprecise legal standards for their reso-
lution, Leaving their determination to the arbitrator does not pose a significant threat
of inhibiting first amendment activity. Consequently, they are not facts of constitutional
significance under Bose Corp., and courts should routinely defer to arbitral findings.
The court may base these three standards of review — de novo review of legal
conclusions, independent review of findings of constitutional facts, and deference to
findings of basic facts — on the record developed in arbitration, and it may resolve them
on cross motions for summary judgment. There should be no need for discovery or a
trial de novo unless there are allegations of fraud, collusion or other arbitral misconduct.
Review of the award under these standards should resolve section 1983 litigation in an
expeditious and cost-effective manner. The standards thus provide appropriate judicial
protection of dissenting employees' rights without sacrificing some of the principal
advantages of arbitration.
Initially, section 1983 litigation will often follow security fee arbitration. As the
courts better define the range of chargeable expenditures, the issues presented in arbi-
tration will become largely factual, and the level of deference to arbitration awards will
increase. At that point, arbitration can operate as an expeditious procedure that simul-
taneously protects dissenters' and unions' rights.
Judicial review limited to the arbitral record can only occur if the arbitrator explains
the award in an accompanying opinion and if the parties maintain a transcript of the
hearing. Furthermore, this limited review should only occur if the witnesses in the
arbitration testified under oath. Although these trappings of formality are optional in
arbitration, their absence leaves a court with no choice but to provide a section 1983
plaintiff with a trial de novo.
VI. EMPLOYER POST-ARBITRATION LIABILITY
Most union security fee plaintiffs sue both the union and the employer. The nec-
essary state action is present in a union security fee case because a contract with a public
body authorizes the union's action. 263. Moreover, Hudson imposes a duty on the employer
as well as the union to provide procedural safeguards for potential objectors. 264 Even
where such safeguards are provided, an arbitrator might err and award the union a fee
that includes expenditures that a court later holds to be nonchargeable. Because the
that the court make a separate, independent judgment on the administrative record;
it would push Freedman too far to require additionally that the court construct its own
record. So far as the first amendment is concerned, the task of historical factfinding
may be left to administrative agencies, at least if ... the agencies' procedures appear
reasonably capable of ensuring reliable findings. At a minimum, this would require
an evidentiary proceeding, with the protections of counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination. Moreover, even if these safeguards are present, a completely de novo
proceeding would seem required unless there is a transcript or written summary of
the administrative proceedings; without such an administrative record, a court cannot
confidently determine either the dimensions of the first amendment claim or the exact
posture in which it was evaluated.
Monaghan, supra note 252, at 526 (citations omitted).
"5 See supra note 109.
"4 See supra note 109 and accompanying text,
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union will spend the money in accordance with the arbitrator's award and thereby violate
the objector's first amendment rights, the union is clearly liable in a successful post-
arbitration section. 1983 action. The employer's liability, if any, in the same action is not
as clear cut.
Holding the employer liable in a post-arbitration lawsuit will make the employer, in
effect, a guarantor of the correctness of the arbitrator's decision and of the way in which
the union spends its funds. Because the employer is not in a position to control the
arbitrator, 265 the potential liability would force the employer to assert at the bargaining
table a right to control the union's expenditures. The employer would have to negotiate
detailed limits on how the union could use union security fees and a right to challenge
union expenditures that the employer believes exceed those limits. The negative impact
that employer supervision of union expenditures would have on orderly labor relations
is readily apparent.
In Hudson the Seventh Circuit held that employer supervision of union expenditures
was constitutionally required if no other governmental body was available to provide
objectors with an administrative hearing. 26" The Supreme Court rejected this proposition
when it authorized arbitration as an appropriate means of resolving fee objections. 267
Hudson, however, does not resolve the issue of whether an employer who agrees with
the union to delegate the task of resolving objections to an arbitrator is liable for the
arbitrator's constitutional errors.
Resolution of this issue requires analysis of the law under section 1983. 268 The
eleventh amendment bars damage actions in federal court against agencies of state
government. 266 Damage actions against local governments are available where actions
pursuant to that government's policy cause a constitutional tort. 2" Thus, the appropriate
inquiry concerning employer post-arbitration liability is whether the constitutional vio-
lation has been caused by the employer's policy. If the collective bargaining agreement,
expressly or impliedly, contains Hudson objection procedures, the employer's policy as
contained in the agreement is to permit the exaction from objectors of a union security
fee that is limited to constitutionally chargeable expenditures. The arbitration procedure
resolves disputes over how much is constitutionally chargeable. Arbitral error in resolving
the dispute does not change the employer's policy. Consequently, the employer is not
liable for damages such an arbitral error causes.
The Supreme Court's rejection of respondent superior as a basis for local government
section 1983 liability27 ' reinforces this conclusion. The Court has premised this rejection
on its view that Congress, in enacting section 1983, sought to require local governments
to control their own acts, but did not seek to compel them to control the acts of others. 272
265 An important issue that is beyond the scope of this article is whether the employer is even
a proper party in a union security fee arbitration.
266 Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. I, 743 F.2d 1187, 1192, 1196 (7th Cir. 1984).
sal
	 475 U.S. at 308 n.21.
208 An objector might seek to sue the employer directly under the fourteenth amendment. Such
actions, however, are not permitted in light of the availability of remedies under section 1983. See
generally S. NAHMOD, CIVIL. RIGHTS AND CIVIL. LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW or SECTION 1983,
§ 6.16 (2d ed. 1986).
24" Id. § 5.08, at 285,
27" Pemhaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477 (1986); Monett v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
27 Pernbaur, 475 U.S. at 478 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
27'2
	 at 479 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-83).
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Thus, the right to control that forms the basis for respondeat superior liability does not
create, in and of itself, a section 1983 duty to control. 2 3
 The public employer does not
even have the right to control the actions of the arbitrator. A fortiori, it cannot have a
duty to control the arbitrator that can form the basis for post-arbitration liability. Once
the arbitrator determines the appropriate fee, the employer's sole role is to administer
ministerially thU fee collection."'
CONCLUSION
In Chicago Teachers Union u. Hudson, the Supreme Court held that dissenting em-
ployees have a right to a reasonably prompt resolution of their objections to union
security fees by a neutral decisionmaker. The Court endorsed the use of arbitration as
a procedure that would be appropriate for resolving the objections.
Implementing a union security fee arbitration procedure requires that attention be
paid to the arbitrator's authority. The source of that authority is the union security clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. The collective bargaining agreement binds em-
ployees to resort to the arbitration procedure before litigating their objections. Prevent-
ing the employee from bypassing the arbitration procedure is consistent with the first
amendment and section 1983 because the escrowing of disputed fees ensures that dis-
senters will suffer no injury pending the outcome of the arbitration.
In post-arbitration litigation, dissenting employees should not receive trials de novo.
Instead, such litigation should subject the arbitration awards to review on three levels:
de novo review of legal conclusions, independent review of constitutional facts and routine
deference to arbitral findings regarding basic facts. Regardless of the outcome of the
court's review of the award, the public employer's liability to objectors ceases if the
employer insures that Hudson procedures are used. These standards will ensure that
union security lee arbitration develops into an effective means of balancing the com-
peting rights of dissenters and the unions that represent them in collective bargaining.
27 ' See S. NAIIMOU, supra note 268, § 6.06.
274
 A comparison of Anela v. City of Wildwood, 79U F.2d 1063 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
434 (1986), with Carbalan v, Vaughn, 760 F.2d 662 (5th Cir.), rev'. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985)
illustrates the relationship between control and constitutional duty. In Anela, the city refused to
follow a New jersey court rule that required police officers in charge to release persons arrested
for minor offenses upon issuance of a summons. 790 F.2d at 1066. The city chose instead to follow
a cash bail schedule for minor offenses set by a municipal judge. Id. The court held that the city's
"policy" of' requiring cash bond in violation of the court rule subjected it to section 1983 liability.
Id. at 1067.
lit Carbalan, a municipal judge, acting contrary to slate law, refused to accept a traffic offender's
automobile club bond endorsement and demanded a cash bond. 760 F.2d at 663-64. The court
held that the city could not control the judge's actions and had no policy of refusing automobile
club bond endorsements. Id. at 665. Consequently, the city had no section 1983 liability. Id.
The employer in a post arbitration setting is more like the city in Carbalan than in Anela. The
employer cannot control the arbitrator's decision or the consequences of that decision. indeed, the
arbitrator's decision implements an employer policy of limiting objectors' union security fees to
chargeable expenditures. To the extent.that the decision is erroneous, it conflicts with the employer's
policy. This conflict does not impose section 1983 liability on the employer. See Talbert v. Kelly, 799
F.2d 62, 65-68 (3d Cir. 1986) (city not liable when police lieutenant acted contrary to city policy in
processing arrestee).
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